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RETHINKING RELIGIOUS OBJECTIONS 
(OLD-TESTAMENT BASED) TO 
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
DoRON M. KAL1R* 
ABSTRACT 
In Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court closed the door on one issue only to open 
the jloodgalPs to another. While recognizing a constitutional right for same-sex marriage, 
the Court also legitimized religious objections to such unions, practically inviting complP,x 
legal challenges to iL1· doors. In doing so, the Court also called for an "open and searching 
debate" on the issue. This A rtic/,e seeks to trigger such debate. 
For millennia, objections to same-sex marriage were cast in religious and moral terms. 
The Jewi'h Bible ("Old Testament"), conventional wisdom argues, provided three demon­
strab/,e proofs of the Bibi.e's abhorrence ofsame-sex intimacy: Genesi'' Story of Creation, the 
tal.e of the City of Sodom (after which the dreadful term "sodomy" was coined), and the 
Levitical prohibition on same-sex intimacy. All three have reached near-axiomatic level over 
the years. 
This Article, however, offers a fresh look into these axioms, questioning their very 
validity. The conventional interpretation, it argues, fails to mui the text in iLs proper 
context. It also Jails to acknowledge the basic premise-the three "organizing principle.s­
on which the entire Jewish Bib/,e is founded. Accordingly, a new, narrower and more con­
gruent interpretation is offered, which properly recognizes the dignity, equality, and empa­
thy of the origi,nal text. 
Religious objections to same-sex marriage are not merely academic. They have 
inflicted tremendous injury on members of the LGBTQ community. It is time to put those 
behind. The "open and searching debate" the (',ourt has called for should instruct us all to 
move towards a more just, fair, and open society. 
When the Almighty himself condescends to address mankind in their own language, his mean­
ing, luminous as it must be, is rendered dim and doubtful lfy the cloudy medium through which it is 
communicated. 
- James Madison1 
INTRODUCTION 
In its seminal Obergefell v. Hodges, 2 the Supreme Court closed the door on 
one issue only to open the floodgates to another. Recognizing a constitutional 
right to same-sex marriage, the Court undoubtedly announced "even more 
* Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland-State University. I would like to thank partici­
pants in faculty workshops at the AALS, Michigan State, Toledo, and Cleveland-Marshall for their 
useful comments. Professors Sherry Colb, Avi Cover, Bill Eskridge, Dena Davis, and Suzanne Goldberg 
were kind to offer comments, edits, and suggestions. Mr. Jeromy Simonovic, Esq., C-M Law Class of 
2015, provided helpful research assistance and thoughtful observations. I am also grateful to C-M Law 
for it5 generous writing grant for this article. I would like to dedicate this article to two C-M Law 
giants: Professor Susan Becker, a national pioneer in the fight for legal recognition of LGBTQ rights; 
and Professor Stephen Werber, a genuine Jewish Law scholar, thinker, and teacher. 
I. THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 197 Qames Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
2. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
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than a landmark civil rights decision."3 Yet the Court intentionally left open 
the issue of religious objections to such marriages, practically inviting complex 
legal challenges to its doors. 4 In doing so, Justice Alito has warned "that those 
who cling to old beliefs will be able to whisper their thoughts in the recesses of 
their homes, but if they repeat those views in public, they will risk being labeled 
as bigots and treated as such by governments, employers, and schools."·5 Justice 
Kennedy, for the Court, replied that "those who believe allowing same-sex mar­
riage is proper or indeed essential, whether as a matter of religi,ous conviction or 
secular belief, may engage those who disagree with their view in an open and 
searching debate. "6 This article is an attempt to ignite such "open and searching 
debate." 
To state the obvious, objections to same-sex intimacy were cast for millen­
nia in religious and moral terms. The Supreme Court, for the most part, not 
only refused to challenge such perceptions but appeared to condone them. 7 
This article argues, however, that traditional religious objections to same-sex 
marriage that rely on the Hebrew Bible ("Old Testament") are far from well 
founded. Those objections, in large part, have little support in the text. They 
have even less support when properly read in context. And they have the least 
support when considered against the interpretive organizing principles of the 
Hebrew Bible. Accordingly, the article argues, the logical conclusion must be 
that nothing in the biblical text suggests objection-religious, moral, or other­
wise-to same-sex intimacy, or, as a result, to same-sex marriage. 
The article proceeds in three parts. Part I introduces the subject-matter of 
the "open and searching debate" on religious objections to same-sex marriage. 
It begins with a brief survey of pertinent Supreme Court statements on the 
issue. It then continues with a presentation of three main objections to same­
sex marriage as they appear in the biblical text: the story of Creation; the Tale 
of the City of Sodom (after which the dreadful term "Sodomy" was coined); and 
the Levitical (alleged) prohibition on, and imposition of the death penalty for, 
homosexual intimacy. It concludes with a short note on the enormous cost 
exacted by these religious objections on members of the LGBTQ community. 
Part II is a primer on reading the Jewish Bible as legal text. This part 
argues that since the biblical text carries legal ramifications-or, at the very 
least, since many a legal decision were influenced by, if not entirely based upon, 
ideas imbedded in the biblical text-it should be interpreted as a legal text. 
Among other things, such classification entails contextual reading, as part of 
the whole edifice, rather than reading each verse in isolation (as has been the 
case until now). In addition, each verse should be interpreted according to 
three organizing principles governing the entire Torah: first, the notion that 
every person was created in the Image of God ("equality"); second, that the 
principle that each of us should treat our fellow persons, or "neighbors," as 
ourselves ("dignity"); and finally, the principle that biblical interpretation is a 
human, majority-based-rather than divine-endeavor ("democracy"). 
3. Kenji Yoshino, Comment, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. RF:v. 
147, 148 (2015). 
4. See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., v. Colo. Civ. Rts. Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (punt­
ing on examining a wedding baker's refusal to serve same-sex marriage ceremony ba•ed on his relig­
ious beliefa). 
5. Obergefe/1, 135 S. Ct. at 2642-43 (Alito, J. dissenting) (emphasis added). It is the humiliating 
treatment of homosexuals, rather than their detractors, by "government•, employers, and schools" 
throughout history that is well documented; Justice Alito's remark, turning the tables on historical 
facts, is nothing short of breathtaking. See infra, Section LC. 
6. Id. at 2607 (empha•is added). 
7. See infra Section I.A. 
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Armed with these insights, the article turns back-in Part III-to the relig­
ious objections introduced in Part I. Reexamining each of them, the article 
concludes that the first two objections-the Story of Creation and the Tale of 
Sodom-lack any textual support for the claim they purport to represent. 
Neither mentions, let alone forbids, same-sex intimacy. Further, there is no 
reason in logic or in principle to read them as objecting to same-sex intimacy. 
Finally, the current objections fail to correspond to any of the organizing prin­
ciples just identified, let alone to all three. Thus, both stories should be 
rejected as grounds for religious objection to same-sex intimacy. The third Bib­
lical premise-the Levitical prohibition-presents a more serious interpretive 
challenge. On its face, it contains a clear textual prohibition on same-sex inti­
macy. Yet read properly in context, and in particular light of the three organiz­
ing principals, that objection, too, fails. Instead, the interpretive process leads 
to the conclusion that the correct reading of the Levitical prohibition should 
apply only to intra-family, incestuous homosexuality. Once all three religious 
objections are presented in their new interpretive light, I conclude by pointing 
to several advantages of such understanding of the Biblical text. 
I. "OPEN AND SEARCHING DEBATE" ON RELIGIOUS OBJECTIONS 
A. The Supreme Court and Religious Objections 
Obergefelfs clarion call to engage in "open and searching debate" was not 
the Court's first foray into the subject of religious objections to same-sex mar­
riage. Far from it. In fact, nearly every time the Court dealt with any aspect of 
LGBTQ right it either acquiescently affirmed, or felt compelled to add, a 
"moral" dimension to its legal opinion. Those "moral" admonitions, as Geof­
frey Stone persuasively demonstrated, were a thinly veiled cover for the Justices' 
religious beliefs.8 Thus, the Court has not only been engaging in that "open 
and searching debate" for years, but, to a large extent, contributed to shaping 
it. Some examples may be helpful. 
1. The Early Cases 
The early cases, also known as the "dark ages" of LGBTQ litigation,9 began 
somewhat surprisingly with a same-sex marriage case. In 1971, Jack Baker, a 
University of Minnesota student, asked to marry his male partner. 10 The Min­
nesota Supreme Court refused. In a brief opinion, the court invoked the Bible 
to explain that " [ t] he institution of marriage as a union of man and woman ... 
is as old as the book of Genesis." 11 Affirming, the Supreme Court dismissed the 
8. See GEOFFREY R. STONE, SEX AND THE CoNsrrruTION xxvii-xxxii (2017) ("[O]ur social mores 
and our laws governing sexual behavior are deeply bound up with religious beliefs and traditions ... A 
central theme of Sex and the Constitution is that American attitudes about sex have been shaped over the 
centuries by religious beliefs-more particularly, by early Christian belie!S-about sex, sin, and shame. A 
nettlesome question in constitutional law is how courts should cope with that history in a nation com­
mitted to the separation of church and state ... As an often furiously divided Supreme Court has 
wrestled with these issues, it has struggled to distinguish between religious conceptions of sin and 
morality, on the one hand, and constitutionally impermissible animus, on the other."); see aLrn Annette 
Gordon-Reed, Our Trouhle wUh Sex: A Christian Story?, N.Y. REv. OF BooKS (Aug. 17, 2017) (book 
review), https:/ /www.nybooks.com/articles/201 7/08/ I 7 /trouble-with-sex-constitution-christian­
story/ ("Writing confidently and expertly about several centuries of American laws regulating sex, 
Stone shows that the line between moral and religious reasoning was almost always illusory."). 
9. See, e.g., Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 660 (7th Cir. 2014). 
10. See MJCflAEL J. GRAETZ & LINDA GREENHOUSE, THE BURGER COURT AND TllE RISE OF THE 
JUDICIAL RIGHT 200-201 (2016). 
II. Baker v. Nelson, 191N.W.2d185, 186 (Minn. 1971). Nearly a generation later, ajustice on 
the Israeli Supreme f'..ourt would invoke-in dissent-the same Genesis reference for the exact same 
reason. See HCJ 721/94 El-Al Israeli Airlines v. Danielovitz, 48(5) PD 749, 768 (1994) (Kedmi, J., 
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case-Baker v. Nelson-with a single sentence for lack of a "substantial federal 
question." 12 Obviously, the Court provided no guidance as to the "book of 
Genesis" reference. 13 
Four years later, in 1976, the Court faced a challenge to the criminality of 
Virginia's sodomy law. Petitioners asked to declare such criminality unconstitu­
tional. Denying the request, the District Court explained that "the longevity of 
the Virginia statute does testify to the State's interest and its legitimacy .... [I]t 
has ancestry going back to Judaic and Christian law."14 To emphasize the 
point, an accompanying footnote cited in full the two well-known verses from 
the Book of Leviticus allegedly prohibiting same-sex intimacy. 15 The Supreme 
Court affirmed in an even shorter decision, consisting all of two words. 16 
The Court waited a decade before taking another same-sex case. 17 Bowers 
v. Hardwick18 featured the Court's first reasoned treatment of the subject. At 
issue was another state law criminalizing same-sex intimacy. 19 This time, how­
ever, the Court could not simply affirm by a single sentence as the lower court 
ruled in favor of the gay couple.20 The Hardwick Court split five-to-four, revers­
ing the appellate court and holding the criminal prohibition constitutional.21 
Justice White's opinion for the Court drips with moral opprobrium.22 It begins 
with an incendiary framing of the question before the Court: "The issue 
presented is whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right 
upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy."23 It reminds us that "[p]roscriptions 
against that conduct have ancient roots."24 It goes on to compare consensual 
same-sex intimacy to "adultery, incest, and other sexual crimes."25 Concluding, 
White notes that " [ t] he law ... is constantly based on notions of morality, and if 
dissenting) (opining that Genesis prevents legal recognition of same-sex couple as a "couple" for work­
place-benefit purposes). 
12. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). 
13. It took over forty years for the Court to overrule this unfortunate opinion: "The right to 
marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person .... Baker v. Nelson must be and now 
is overruled." Obergefel~ 135 S. Ct. at 2604-05. 
14. Doe v. Commonwealth's Att'y for City of Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1202 (E.D. Va. 
1975), ajfd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976). 
15. See id. at 1202 n.2. Those verses will be discussed infra B3. But see id. at 1205 (Merhige, J., 
dissenting) ("To suggest, as defendant> do, that the prohibition on homosexual conduct will in some 
manner encourage new heterosexual marriages and prevent the dissolution of existing ones is unwor­
thy ofjudicial response.... My brothers, I respectfully suggest, have by today's ruling misinterpret the 
issue-the issue centers not around morality or decency, but the constitutional right of privacy."). 
16. Doe v. Commonwealth's Att'y for City of Richmond, 425 U.S. 901, 901 (1976) ("Judgment 
affirmed."). 
17. A' Graetz and Greenhouse explain, the first two cases arrived at the Court by right; Bowers 
was the first case the Court elected to hear. See CRAET/. & GREENHOUSE, supra note 10, at 200-02. 
18. See 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
19. GA. Cone ANN.§ 16-6-2 (1984) ("A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs 
or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one persons and the mouth or anus of 
another ...."). Note that the text does not mention, let alone is limited to, same-sex relations. For a 
discussion, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Hardwick and Historiogra/Jhy, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 631 (1999). 
20. See Ha1·dwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (11th Cir. 1985). 
21. The story of the stunning reversal byJustice Powell, who voted initially for Mr. Hardwick but 
then changed his mind-not before informing his gay clerk that "I don't believe I have ever met a 
homosexual"-is, by now, part of Supreme Court lore. So is, unfortunately, his recanting four years 
later. See, e.g., GRAET/. & GREENHOUSE, sujJm note IO, at 210-11; STONE, sufmt note 8, at 476--77; JEF· 
FERY TOOBIN, THE NINE 218-19 (2007). 
22. Cf. GRAET/. & GREENHOUSE, supra note 10, at 210 ("White's opinion ... was dismissive in the 
extreme."). 
23. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190. Years later, Justice Kennedy would write, overruling Bawers: "To say 
that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the 
individual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to said marriage is simply 
about the right to have sexual intercourse." Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003). 
24. Bowers, 4 78 U.S. at 192. 
25. Id. at 196. 
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all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the 
Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed."26 
ChiefJustice Burger's concurrence27 was even more infused with religious 
zeal: 
As the Court notes, the proscriptions against sodomy have very "ancient 
roots." ... Condemnation of those practices is firmly rooted inJudaeo-Christian 
moral and ethical standards.... To hold that the act of homosexual sodomy is 
somehow protected as a fundamental right would be to cast aside millennia of 
moral teaching.28 
Justice Blackmun's dissent (for four justices) presents a moral polar oppo­
site. It begins by re-framing the issue, calling upon Justice Brandeis' memora­
ble formulation of the right to privacy: 
This case is no more about "a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sod­
omy," as the Court purports to declare, than [Stanley v. Georgia] was about a 
fundamental right to watch obscene movies ... Rather, this case is about "the 
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men," 
namely, "the right to be let alone."29 
Not hesitating to confront the moral controversy head on, Blackmun 
continued: 
But the fact that the moral judgments expressed by statutes like [the Georgia 
law] may be "'natural or familiar ... ought not to conclude our judgment upon 
the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of 
the United States.'" Like Justice Holmes, I believe that "[i]t is revolting to have 
no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of 
Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down 
have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the 
past"3o 
Turning to the Biblical language itself, Justice Blackmun reminded us how 
important the division is between church and state: 
The assertion that "traditional Judeo-Christian values proscribe" the conduct 
involved cannot provide an adequate justification for [the Georgia law]. That 
certain, but by no means all, religious groups condemn the behavior at issue 
gives the State no license to impose their judgments on the entire citizenry. The 
legitimacy of secular legislation depends instead on whether the State can 
advance some justification for its law beyond its conformity to religious doctrine. 
Thus, far from buttressing his case, petitioner's invocation of Leviticus, Romans, 
St. Thomas Aquinas, and sodomy's heretical status during the Middle Ages 
undermines his suggestion that [the Georgia law] represents a legitimate use of 
secular coercive power. A state can no more punish private behavior because of 
religious intolerance than it can punish such behavior because of racial 
animus.31 
26. Id. 
27. Su STONE, supra note 8, at 478 (describing Burger as "[a] lifelong Presbyterian, who was 
clearly disturbed by the very existence of Hardwick's claim"). 
28. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196-97 (Burger, CJ., concurring) (citation omitted). 
29. id. at 199 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 
277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis,,J., dissenting)). 
30. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 
457, 469 (1897)). 
31. Id. at 211-12 (al tern.ti on in original) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted); see also id. at 216 
(Stevens,J., dissenting) ("[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a 
particular prnctice as immoral is not sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice; 
neither history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack."). 
Years later, Justice Kennedy-writing for the Court-would quote this dissent and remark: "Justice 
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2. The Kennedy Era 
The yearl 996 marked a turning point for same-sex jurisprudence. It was 
not only the first year same-sex activists prevailed in a Supreme Court battle in 
their decades-old fight; it also marked the first time Justice Anthony Kennedy 
authored the opinion for the Court.32 A new era was ushered in: no longer 
were same-sex acts-and same-sex activists-seen as a judicial pariah; they were 
now treated with dignity, equality, and respect. And Justice Kennedy was this 
era's main architect.33 
A devout Catholic,34 Justice Kennedy tended to keep a strict separation of 
"church and state" in his judicial opinions; indeed, one will be hard-pressed to 
find a biblical quote or a reference to the ''.Judea-Christian tradition" in his 
treatment of LGBTQ rights. Yet the introduction of Kennedy's approach did 
not quite eliminate the moral and biblical condemnation from the Court's 
opinions; rather, they were simply relegated to the dissent. Thus, in one dis­
senting opinion after another, Justice Scalia and other Justices reminded their 
readers of the moral and religious abomination associated-in their mind­
with such acts. 
The first Kennedy-era case was Romer v. Evans.35 There, three Colorado 
cities passed laws proscribing discrimination based on sexual orientation. The 
State of Colorado, by a constitutional amendment, repealed these local laws.36 
Writing for a six-to-three Court, Justice Kennedy immediately signaled the new 
direction in which the Court was heading: "The amendment withdraws from 
homosexuals, but no others, specific legal protection from the injuries caused 
by discrimination ...."37 This, Kennedy reasoned, cannot be tolerated by the 
Constitution: "We must conclude that Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not 
to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else. 
This Colorado cannot do."38 
This tolerant, forward-looking, and dignifying view was not shared by all. 
Justice Scalia, who was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, 
begun his dissent with a reference to a distant past: "The constitutional amend­
ment before us here is not the manifestation of 'bare ... desire to harm' homo­
sexuals, but is rather a modest attempt by seemingly tolerant Coloradans to 
preserve traditional sexual mores against the effort of a politically powerful 
minority to revise those mores through use of the laws. "39 Echoing earlier com­
parisons by the Court to other crimes, Scalia went on: 
I had thought that one could consider certain conduct reprehensible-murder, 
for example, or polygamy, or cruelty to animals-and could exhibit even "ani-
Stevens' analysis, in our view, should have been controlling in Bowers and should control here." Law­
rence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
32. See MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED 156-180 (2005). 
33. Adam Liptak, Surprising Friend of the Gay Rights Movement in a High Place, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 
2013), h ttps://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/ us/surprisi ng-friend-0f-gay-righ t'-i n-a-high-place.html 
(quoting Professor Michael Do1i; a former clerk, as saying "what Earl Warren was to civil rights and 
what Ruth Bader Ginsburg was to women's right,, Kennedy is to gay rights"). 
34. See, e.g., TooBIN, su/JTa note 21, at 221 ("[justice Kennedy was] a conse1vative man by most 
definitions of that term. A devout and observant Catholic, he needed no instruction in the religious 
and moral prnhibitions on homosexual conduct. He was, simply, a man who had been transformed by 
the changing world around him."). But see BRUCE ALLEN MuRPflY, SCALIA: A CoURT Of ONE 152 (2014) 
("Unlike Scalia's devoutly conservative Catholic immigrant father, Kennedy was raised by Catholic 
parent' based in the more openly inclusive religious mores of Sacramento, California."). 
35. See517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
36. Over two decades later, the issue of anti-Oiscrimination laws in the State of Colorado are far 
from resolved. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., v. Colo. Civ. Rt,. Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). 
37. Romer, 517 U.S. at 627. 
38. Id. at 635. 
39. Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
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mus" towards such conduct. Surely that is the only sort of "animus" at issue 
here: moral disapproval of homosexual conduct, the same sort of moral disap­
proval that produced the centuries-old criminal laws that we held constitutional 
in Bowers.40 
Justice Scalia did not stop at comparing same-sex intimacy with murder. 
He reminded us of "the view that homosexuality is morally wrong and socially 
harmful;"41 he presented arguments on behalf of those who wish to retain the 
social disapprobation of homosexuality;42 he called the amendment a "reasona­
ble effort to preserve traditional American moral values;"43 and he concluded 
by noting that the amendment in question "is designed to prevent piecemeal 
deterioration of the sexual morality favored by the majority of 
Coloradans ...."44 Alas, his was only the dissenting view. 
Seven years after Roemer, in 2003, it was time to revisit Bowers and the 
criminalization of same-sex intimacy itself. Lawrence v. Texas45 did just that. Jus­
tice Kennedy authored the opinion overruling Bowers. Again, Justice Scalia 
wrote the dissent, vehemently objecting to the new moral order. 
Typically, Kennedy's opinion in Lawrence is based on liberty rather than 
biblical references; on freedom rather than sexual mores; and on privacy rather 
than moral opprobrium. Still, in order to overrule Bowers, Kennedy had to 
tackle the moral, canonical, and biblical implications of the opinion. To do so, 
Kennedy first confronted Bowers' assertion that "proscriptions against that con­
duct have ancient roots."46 That was factually wrong, Kennedy declared: "[F]ar 
from possessing 'ancient roots,' American laws targeting same-sex couples did 
not develop until the last third of the 20th Century."47 But time was never the 
real issue, and Kennedy knew that: 
It must be acknowledged, of course, that the Court in Bowers was making the 
broader point that for centuries there have been powerful voices to condemn 
homosexual conduct as immoral. The condemnation has been shaped l:ty religious 
beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, and respect for the tradi­
tional family. For many persons these are not trivial concerns but profound and 
deep convictions accepted as ethical and moral principles to which they aspire 
and which thus determine the course of their lives. These considerations do not 
answer the question before us, however. The issue is whether the majority may 
use the power of the State to enforce these views on the whole society through 
operation of the criminal law. "Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not 
to mandate our own moral code."48 
Justice Kennedy then addressed Chief Justice Burger's concurrence. He 
noted that: 
As with Justice White's assumptions about history, scholarship casts some doubt 
on the sweeping nature of the statement by the ChiefJustice Burger 
The sweeping references by ChiefJustice Burger to the history of Western 
Civilization and to Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards did not take 
account of other authorities pointing in the opposite direction. 
40. Id. at 644. 
41. Id. at 645. 
42. See id. 
43. Id. at 651. 
44. Id. at 653. 
45. See 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
46. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986). 
47. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 570 (citations omitted). 
48. Id. at 571 (emphasis added) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
850 (1992)). 
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Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these pur­
poses, just as heterosexual persons do. The decision in Bowers would deny them 
this right.49 
Kennedy then concluded: "[Bowers'] continuance as precedent demeans 
the lives of homosexual persons.... Bowers was not correct when it was decided, 
and it is not correct today.... Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is 
overruled."50 
Justice O'Connor, concurring, also commented on the moral dimension of 
the case: 
This case raises a different issue than Bowers: whether, under the Equal Protec­
tion Clause, moral disapproval is a legitimate state interest to justify by itself a 
statute than bans homosexual sodomy, but not heterosexual sodomy. It is not. 
Moral disapproval of this group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is an 
interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal Protec­
tion Clause.51 
And she concluded: "A law branding one class of persons as criminal based 
solely on the State's moral disapproval of that class ... runs contrary to the 
values of the Constitution."52 
Justice Scalia, again dissenting with Justices Rehnquist and Thomas, contin­
ued his crusade against the morality of same-sex intimacy: 
The Texas statute undeniably seeks to further the belief of its citizens that cer­
tain forms of sexual be havior are "immoral and unacceptable"-the same inter­
est furthered by criminal laws against fornication, bigamy, adultery, adult incest, 
bestiality, and obscenity .... The Court embraces [today] Justice Stevens' decla­
ration in his Bowers dissent, that "the fact that the governing majority in a State 
has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason 
for upholding a law prohibiting the practice." This effectively decrees the end 
of all morals [sic] legislation. If, as the Court asserts, the promotion of 
majoritarian sexual morality is not even a legitimate state interest, none of the 
above-mentioned laws can survive rational-basis review.53 
It is then that Justice Scalia went on a tirade, which, unfortunately, became 
infamous in the annals of LGBTQjurisprudence: 
Today's opinion is the product of a Court, which is the product of a law-profes­
sion culture, that has largely signed on to the so-called homosexual agenda, by 
which I mean the agenda promoted by some homosexual activists directed at 
eliminating the moral opprobrium that has traditionally attached to homosexual 
conduct. 
. . . It is clear from this that the Court has taken sides in the culture war .... 
Many Americans do not want persons who openly engage in homosexual con­
duct as partners in their business, as scoutmasters for their children, as teachers 
in their children's schools, or as boarders in their home. They view this as pro­
tecting themselves and their families from a lifestyle that they believe to be 
immoral and destructive.::;4 
Fortunately, this "lifestyle"-based opinion was rejected by the Court. 
49. Id. at 571-74. 
50. Id. at 575-78. 
51. Id. at 582 (O'Connor,J., concurring). 
52. fd. at 585. 
53. Id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 
186, 216 (1986) (Stevens,J., dissenting)). 
54. Id. at 602. 
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Twelve years following Lawrence, in 2013, the Court heard the case of Edith 
Windsor, who lawfully married her same-sex partner according to state law. 
Federal law, however-the Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA")-denied her 
recognition of this marriage. The question before the Court was whether 
DOMA was constitutional. Writing for a five-to-four Court, Justice Kennedy 
held it was not: 
DOMA instructs all federal officials, and indeed all persons with whom same-sex 
couples interact, including their own children, that their marriage is less worthy 
than the marriages of others. The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate 
purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those 
whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and 
dignity.SS 
Justice Scalia's dissent was, at this point, all but predictable. Joined in full 
only by Justice Thomas, and in part by ChiefJustice Roberts, Scalia begins his 
opinion by quoting his Lawrence dissent, where he stated that "the Constitution 
does not forbid the government to enforce traditional moral and sexual 
norms."·56 He then asserted that he was willing to cast aside "traditional moral 
disapproval of same-sex marriage (or indeed of same-sex sex)," for "perfectly 
valid-indeed, downright boring-justifying rationales for [DOMA]."s7 Scalia 
continued by claiming that "to defend traditional marriage is not to condemn, 
demean, or humiliate those who would prefer other arrangements ...."s8 
Reflecting on history, he asserted that the institution of opposite-sex marriage 
had been "unquestioned in our society for most of its existence-indeed, had 
been unquestioned in virtually all societies for virtually of human history. "s9 
Finally, Justice Scalia described the majority opinion as "a lecture on how supe­
rior the majority's moral judgment in favor of same-sex marriage is to the Con­
gress's hateful moral judgment against it."60 
The current last word on the legality of same-sex relations was provided in 
2015, when the Court recognized the right to same-sex marriage. Obergefell v. 
Hodges,61 however, rarely discussed the morality of same-sex relations. Instead, it 
returned to the Levitical prohibition-and to the religious beliefs of those who 
support it-in a surprising way: the recognition of the right to marry, asserted 
the dissent, jeopardizes the religious freedom of those who oppose it. 
Justice Kennedy's opinion for the five-to-four Court did not evade the 
issue: 
Many who deem same-sex marriage to be wrong reach that conclusion based on 
decent and honorable religious or philosophical premises, and neither they nor their 
beliefs are disparaged here. But when that sincere, personal opposition becomes 
enacted law and public policy, the necessary consequence is to put the imprima­
tur of the State itself on an exclusion that soon demeans or stigmatizes those 
whose own liberty is then denied. Under the Constitution, same-sex couples 
seek in marriage the same legal treatment as opposite-sex couples, and it would 
disparage their choices and diminish their personhood to deny them this 
right.62 
Near the end of his opinion, no doubt in response to some of the concerns 
raised by the dissent, Kennedy addressed the issue once again: 
55. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 775 (2013). 
56. Id. at 795 (Scalia,J., dissenting). 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 797. 
59. Id. at 798. 
60. Id. 
61. See 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2584. 
62. Id. at 2602 (emphasis added). 
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Finally, it must be emphasized that religions, and those who adhere to religious 
doctrines, may continue to advocate with utmost, sincere conviction that, by 
divine precepts, same-sex marriage should not be condoned. The First Amend­
ment ensures that religious organizations and persons are given proper protec­
tion as they seek to teach the principles that are so fulfilling and so central to 
their lives and faiths, and to their own deep aspirations to continue the family 
structure they have long revered.63 
It is then that Kennedy makes his invite for "open and searching" debate. 
The dissenting Justices were not convinced. The Chief Justice, for one, 
wrote: 
Today's decision ... creates serious questions about religious liberty. Many 
good and decent people oppose same-sex marriage as a tenet of faith, and their 
freedom to exercise religion is-unlike the right imagined by the majority­
actually spelled out in the Constitution. 
Respect for sincere religious conviction has led voters and legislators in 
every State that has adopted same-sex marriage democratically to include accom­
modations for religious practice. The majority's decision imposing same-sex 
marriage cannot, of course, create any such accommodations. The majority gra­
ciously suggests that religious believers may continue to "advocate" and "teach" 
their views of marriage. The First Amendment guarantees, however, the free­
dom to "exercise" religion. Ominously, that is not a word the majority uses.64 
Justice Scalia dedicated a major portion of his dissenting opinion-by now 
joined only by Justice Thomas-to religious concerns. He began with an 
astounding allegation: "[T]he majority's decision threatens the religious liberty 
our Nation has long sought to protect."65 He then goes on to survey the history 
of religious liberty in America, where marriage is not merely a civil union but "a 
religious institution as well. "66 He then warns that "[i] t appears all but inevita­
ble that the two will come into conflict, particularly as individuals and churches 
are confronted with demands to participate in and endorse civil marriages 
between same-sex couples."67 He then castigates the majority opinion as 
[I]ndicat[ing] a misunderstanding of religious liberty in our Nation's tradition. 
Religious liberty is about more than just the protection for "religious organiza­
tions and persons ... as they seek to teach the principles that are so fulfilling 
and so central to their lives and faiths." Religious liberty is about freedom of 
action in matters of religion generally, and the scope of that liberty is directly 
correlated to the civil restraints placed upon religious practice.68 
Scalia ends this part of his dissent with a stern warning: "[T]he majority's 
decision short-circuits [the political] process, with potentially ruinous conse­
quences for religious liberty."69 
Similar concerns were raised by Justice Alito. Writing for three dissenters, 
he warned that the Court's opinion "will be used to vilify Americans who are 
unwilling to assent to the new orthodoxy."70 He noted that the majority "com­
pares traditional marriage laws to laws that denied equal treatment for African­
Americans and women,"71 adding that "[t]he implications of this analogy will 
be exploited by those who are determined to stamp out every vestige of dis­
63. Id. at 2607. 
64. Id. at 2625 (Roberts, CJ, dissenting) (citations omitted). 
65. Id. at 2638 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. (citations omitted). 
69. Id. at 2639. 
70. Id. at 2642 (Ali to, J., dissenting). 
71. Id. 
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sent."72 He then concluded by assuming "that those who cling to old beliefs 
will be able to whisper their thoughts [only] in the recesses of their 
"
73homes . It is now time to introduce these "old beliefs." 
B. The Case for Religious Objections 
As Harvard theologian Peter Gomes has noted, "[a]mong religious people 
who wish to take the bible seriously there is no more vexed topic today than 
that of homosexuality. "74 That vexed topic, to the extent it relies on Old Testa­
ment text to justify religious objections to same-sex marriage, is rooted in three 
primary Biblical sources: The Genesis story of creation ("Adam & Eve, not 
Adam & Steve"); the tale of the City of Sodom (for which the dreadful term 
"Sodomy" was coined); and two verses in the Book of Leviticus, which seem to 
forbid entirely, and then threaten to punish by death, any act of same-sex inti­
macy between men. We turn now to briefly introduce the case for each of these 
religious objections. 
1. The Genesis Story of Creation 
The Genesis story of creation places heterosexual relations as its ideal. 
First, when God created man, He does so with an explicit emphasis on men and 
women: "So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he 
him; male and female created he them."75 Indeed, God's very first order to the 
"male and female" he just created76 was to engage in heterosexual sex: "And 
God blessed them, and God said unto them, Be fruitful and multiply, and 
replenish the earth."77 Those verses prove-so goes the argument-that God 
intended to create "Adam and Eve, not Adam and Steve."78 The paradigmatic 
relationship described in the Bible is that of a man and a woman, not of per­
sons of the same sex. Indeed, the text goes on to describe what today we con­
sider as marriage between a man and woman: "Therefore shall a man leave his 
father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife: and they shall be one 
flesh." 79 That paradigm is not limited to humans, as the story of Noah's Ark 
proves, but rather to all animals: "And of every living thing of all flesh, two of 
every sort shalt thou bring into the ark, to keep them alive with thee; they shall 
be male and female. "80 
By creating a "man and a woman"; by ordering them to "be fruitful and 
multiply"; by describing opposite-sex marriage as the ideal; and by emphasizing 
the need for procreation for all living things-the story of creation clearly dem­
onstrates the Bible's strong preference for opposite-sex relations and, concomi­




74. PETER]. GOMES, THE Goon BOOK 144 (1996). 
75. GenP.sis 1 :27 (King James). Unless otherwise noted, the translation from the Hebrew will 
follow King James Bible ("KJB") version. Small annotations in parenthesis, e.g., [And], will denote my 
corrections from the Hebrew original. 
76. See Genesis 5:2 ("Male and female created He them; and blessed them."). 
77. Genesis 1 :28. 
78. GOMES, supra note 74, at J49. 
79. Genesis 2:24. 
80. Genesis 6:19. 
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2. The Tale of Sodom 
The second basis for religious objection to same-sex intimacy can be found 
in the Tale of Sodom. According to this argument, "[t] his story has been inter­
preted in Christian theology as revealing God's condemnation of same-sex 
sex."81 Indeed, "[t]he story of Sodom in Genesis 18 and 19 is generally 
accepted as the biblical source for prohibition against homosexual behavior ... 
[It] is popularly believed to demonstrate God's abhorrence of homosexual acts 
and to embody his most profound prohibition against them."82 It also led to 
the coining of the (unfortunate) term "sodomy," likely by Peter Damian in the 
eleventh century,83 which was later used for criminalization of same-sex 
intimacy. 
The tale of Sodom begins in Genesis Chapter 18, when God reflects on the 
sinful ways of its residents and considers whether to annihilate them all: "And 
the Lord said, Because the cry of Sodom and Gomorrah is great, and because 
their sin is very grievous; I will go down now, and see whether they have done 
altogether according to the cry of it ...."84 Abraham, in turn, who is "standing 
before God," began to beg for the Sodom people's lives while engaging in one 
of the greatest moral arguments of all time: "That be far from thee to do after 
this manner, to slay the righteous with the wicked: and that the righteous 
should be as the wicked, that be far from thee: Shall not the Judge of all the 
earth do right?"85 The next chapter begins with another, though related, story: 
two persons-"angels" as they are described by the text86-arrive at Sodom, 
and are welcomed by Lot, Abraham's nephew. Much like his uncle, Lot is very 
generous to the strangers arriving at his door. He pleads with them to spend 
the night with him. While they initially refuse, they finally accept his invitation 
(after some persuasion). They then enter Lot's home, enjoy a proper meal, 
and prepare for the night. It is then that the "Sodom" story begins: 
But before they lay down, the men of the city, the men of Sodom, compassed the 
house round, both old and young, all the people from every quarter: And they 
called unto Lot, and said unto him, Where are the men which came in to thee 
this night? Bring them out unto us, that we may know them. And Lot went out 
at the door unto them, and shut the door after him, And said, I pray you, breth­
ren, do not so wickedly. Behold now, I have two daughters which have not 
known man; let me, I pray you, bring them out unto you, and do ye to them as is 
good in your eyes: only unto these men do nothing; for therefore came they 
81. STONE, supra note 8, at 14. 
82. BYRNE foNE, HOMOPHOBIA 75-77 (2000). 
83. See Michael Carden, lnlerprelalion lo Genesis, in Tm: QUEER BIBLE COMMENTARY 37 (Deryn 
Guest et al. eds., 2000). Incidentally, the identification of a geographic place with an LCBTQ ten­
dency is not unique to the City of Sodom: The Greek island of Lesbos comes to mind, as well a.' the city 
of Florence in Italy. See, e.g., Claudia Roth Pierpont, The Secret Lives of Leonardo Da Vinci, NEW YoRKER 
(Oct. 16, 2017), llltps://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/10/16/the-secret-lives-of-leonardo-da­
vinci ("But the crime that the [Florence city] government was really trying to control was sodomy, so 
notoriously prevalent that contemporat)' German slang for a homosexual was FWrenzer."). 
84. Genesis 18:20-21. 
85. Genesis 18:25. The Hebrew original is more artful: "Would the Judge of the entire earth not 
do justice?" For a similar idea, compare some other translations: JPS, New American Standard, 
Holmes Chtistian Standard Bible, and New American Standard Bible. 
86. The meaning of the term "Angels" (in Hebrew: "Mal"a'chim"), a.< used here, is not entirely 
clear. The Biblical text sometimes uses "Angels" to denote simple human messengers. See, e.g., Num­
bers 22:5 (The 01iginal Hebrew refers to "Mal 'a'chim, while the KJB version translates as "messen­
gers."). The reverse is also true: sometimes the Biblical text uses the term "man" to denote an angel, 
a' in the story ofJacob's struggle with the Angel. See Genesis 32:25. Also, Abraham's welcoming of the 
three Angels-all described in the text a.< "men." See Genesis 18:2. Finally, sometimes divine angels are 
referred to as "angels of God," eliminating any interpretational doubt as to their identity. See, e.g., 
Genesis 28:12 (the story ofJacob's ladder). 
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under the shadow of my roof.... And the [city people] pressed sore upon ... 
Lot, and came near to break the door.B7 
Despite the standoff, the story ends well: the mystery guests save Lot and 
his family while hitting the mob surrounding the house with blinding lights. 
Later, the city is destroyed, while Lot and his family escape.BB 
The religious-objection argument advanced by this story is that the men of 
Sodom-young and old-wanted to "know" the guests in the Biblical sense, i.e., 
to have sex with them.B9 Even Lot, goes the argument, knew that; why else 
would he offer his daughters, who had "not known man," to the angry mob? 
Clearly, the story is infused with moral opprobrium by God toward the town 
people who wanted to harm the guests in this specific, sexual manner. It is for 
that wrong that their city was destroyed by God. Clearly, goes the argument, 
such untoward behavior should be prevented for all time. Such actions, in fact, 
should be penalized and punished. These acts should be termed "sodomy." 
3. The Levitical Prohibition on Same-Sex Intimacy 
The third and final basis for religious objections to same-sex intimacy is the 
most direct. Two verses in the Book of Leviticus seem, at first blush, to com­
pletely prohibit any act of same-sex intimacy, and then to threaten those who 
perform such acts with the death penalty. In the Jewish tradition, these two 
verses created almost the sole basis for an entire edifice of anti-gay Jaw.90 
The first verse is Leviticus 18:22. It states, in its entirety: "[And] Thou shalt 
not lie with mankind, as with womankind: it is abomination."91 The second 
verse is Leviticus 20:13. It states, in its entirety: "[And] If a man also lie with 
mankind, as he lieth with a woman, both of them have committed an abomina­
tion: they shall surely be put to death; their blood shall be upon them."92 
Here the argument is straightforward. It is textually-based. The Bible, the 
argument goes, clearly forbids same-sex intimacy. It even threatens death upon 
anyone who dares to engage in such acts. Surely, the argument goes, if same 
sex intimacy is prohibited, then same-sex marriage-which is premised upon 
such acts and are designed to perpetuate them-could not be tolerated. 
C. The Cost of Religfous Objections 
The price that LGBTQ persons had to pay due to these religious objec­
tions, merely for the object of their Jove, is simply hard to fathom. Harvard 
psychologist Steven Pinker may have summarized it best by exclaiming that, 
At least since Leviticus 20:13 prescribed the death penalty for a man lying with 
mankind as he lieth with a woman, many governments have used their monop­
oly on violence to imprison, torture, mutilate, and kill homosexuals. A gay per­
son who escaped government violence in the form laws against indecency, 
sodomy, buggery, unnatural acts, or crimes against nature was vulnerable to vio­
87. Genesis 19:4-9 (alteration in original). 
88. See Gene.sis 19:24-25. 
89. See, e.g., Daniel A. Helminiak, What the Bible Really Says About Homosexuality 45 (Mill ed. 
2000) ("The verb 'to know' occurs some 943 times in the [Hebrew Bible]. In ten of those cases the 
word has a sexual meaning. The present text [of the tale of Sodom] is one of those ten."). 
90. See, e.g., Steven Greenberg, Wrestling with God and Men: Homosexuality in the.Jewish Tradi­
tion 3 (2004) ("Two verses in the Torah (Lev. 18:22 and 20:13) have been understood for millennia to 
prohibit same-sex sexual relations between men. Since Orthodox Jews believe that the Torah is the 
word of God, the Levitical prohibition against sex between men has the full weight of divine 
authority."). 
91. Leviticus 18:22. 
92. Leviticus 20:13. 
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lence from his fellow citizens in the form of gay-bashing, homophobic violence, 
and antigay hate crimes.93 
Hatred against gay people is indeed so universal across space and time that 
it was shared by the most sworn of enemies. For example, very little could cul­
turally unite Nazi Germany, which developed the Enigma code, and World War 
II Britain, home to Alan Turing who cracked it, other than the persecution of 
and animus towards gay men.94 
This shameful history was shared, until very recently, by the United States. 
As Judge Posner explained in 2014: 
Because homosexuality is not a voluntary condition and homosexuals are among 
the most stigmatized, misunderstood, and discriminated-against minorities in 
the history of the world, the disparagement of their sexual orientation, implicit 
in the denial of marriage rights to same-sex couples, is a source of continuing 
pain to the homosexual community. 
. . . [U]ntil quite recently homosexuality was anathematized by the vast 
majority of ... the American people .... Homosexuals had, as homosexuals, no 
rights; homosexual sex was criminal (though rarely prosecuted); homosexuals 
were formally banned from the armed forces and many other types of govern­
ment work (though again enforcement was sporadic); and there were no laws 
prohibiting employment discrimination against homosexuals .... [T]o avoid 
discrimination and ostracism they had to conceal their homosexuality and so 
were reluctant to participate openly in homosexual relationships or reveal their 
homosexuality to the heterosexuals with whom they associated. Most of them 
stayed "in the closet." Same-sex marriage was out of the question, even though 
interracial marriage was legal in most states. Although discrimination against 
homosexuals has diminished greatly, it remains widespread.95 
Thirty years earlier, John Hart Ely used similar terms in his seminal Democ­
racy and Distrust to explain why such discrimination should receive strict scru­
tiny: "Homosexuals for years have been the victims of both 'first-degree 
prejudice' and subtler forms of exaggerated we-they stereotyping .... It is 
therefore a combination of the factors of prejudice [against homosexuals] and 
hideability [by them] that renders classifications that disadvantage homosexuals 
suspicious."96 
Such cost-a systematic persecution, derision, humiliation, and animus­
exerted by governments on their own citizens for no reason other than their 
love object cannot be justified. The very act of same-sex intimacy-consensu­
ally, and between adults-can cause no harm. Indeed, it never has.97 Jn 1955, 
the American Law Institute-adopting Mill's harm principle-explained why 
such behavior should never be regulated: "[N]o harm to secular interest of 
93. STEVEN PINKER, Tim BnTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE 447-48 (2011). 
94. See generally ANDREW HoDGES, ALAN TURJNc: T11E ENIGMA (1983). 
95. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 658--65 (7th Cir. 2014); sp,e also Rowland v. Mad River Local 
Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1014 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) ("Because of 
the immediate and severe opprobrium often manifested against homosexuals once so identified pub­
licly .... it is fair to say that discrimination against homosexuals is likely ... to reflect deep-seated 
prejudice rather than ... rationality.") (internal citation omitted); id. ("[H]omosexuals have histori­
cally been the o~ject of pernicious and sustained hostility ...."). 
96. jOJlN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DtSTRUST 162-63 (1980). 
97. Some claims that were made, during oral argument in the Supreme Court and elsewhere, 
regarding the possible damage to the institution of heterosexual marriage due to the recognition of 
same-sex marriage are so laughable they do not merit mention in an academic article. Cf Doe v. 
Commonwealth's Att'y for City of Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1203-05 (E.D. Va. 1975) (Merhige,.J., 
dissenting). 
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community is involved in atypical sex practice in private between consenting 
adult partners."98 Such behavior, in other words, is "not the law's business."99 
The notion, however, that such cost was mainly caused by religious and 
moral convictions makes it even harder to digest. The enforcement of morality 
alone, as H.L.A Hart has noted, "calls for justification."100 Even more, state 
enforcement of religious convictions, without more, is-and should be-consti­
tutionally proscribed.101 
Perhaps most importantly, however, the entire edifice of state condemna­
tion-and the horrendous consequences it brought over time-rests on the 
assumption that the Bible prohibits same-sex intimacy. But is that really the 
case? To that we turn now. 
II. ON INTERPRETING THE JEWISH BIBLE AS LEGAL TEXT 
Before we return to the verses cited in Part I, we should first examine the 
text in which they are included. For many, indeed most, this text-whether 
called the Old Testament, Five Books ofMoses, or the Torah-is a holy text. Its 
source is divine. It tells the absolute truth, straight from the mouth of God. For 
others, it is an archeological artifact, an ancient book preserved, letter by letter, 
for thousands of years. For still others, it is a book of reflection, meditation, 
and solace. 102 For the purposes of this article, however, we must approach the 
Jewish Bible as a legal text. 103 By "legal" I mean a text that regulates human 
behavior; that assigns consequences (or sanctions) to violators; and that sets up 
a mechanism for enforcing such consequences. 104 As we have seen, the rele­
vant verses were indeed deemed to regulate certain aspects of human behavior 
(mainly same-sex intimacy); some of them (specifically the Levitical verses) pre­
scribed specific consequences; and, as we have seen, these consequences were 
carried out by laws and courts for over millennia. 
We begin this section by discussing the ramifications of treating the Old 
Testament as a legal text. We then identify the three interpretive organizing 
principles that will guide us in re-approaching the text in the next section. 
A The Bible as Legal Text 
The first and foremost consequence of viewing the Bible as legal-as 
opposed to merely a divine-text is the immediate release of any preconceived 
notions as to its meaning. Indeed, if we truly want to conduct an honest inter­
pretive inquiry into the meaning of the verses in question we cannot a priori 
98. H.L.A. HART, L\W, LIBERlY, AND MORALITI' 15 (1963) (quoting MODEL PENAL CoDE § 207.5 
cmt. at 277 (Proposed Official Draft 1955)). 
99. Id. at 15. 
100. Id. at 82. 
101. See U.S. ConsL amend. I. 
102. See, e.g., STEVF:N B. SMITH, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 91 (2012) ("There are many ways to begin 
to read the Bible. It can be read as a book of wisdom providing timeless lessons on life's most difficult 
problems. It can be read as a holy book given by God to Moses .... It can be read as a historical work 
providing archaeological and anthropological information about the world of the ancient Near EasL 
Or it can be read, as I propose to do, as a political book."). 
103. Indeed, without such an approach there is no point to our interpretive journey. See, e.g.. 
Elia Leibowitz, New Reading in the Old Testament 20 (2016) (Hebrew) ("Those who believe that the 
Bible was authored by a super-natural entity, or ... that at lea5t the Five Books of Moses were written 
by the Holy Spirit ... may probably not accept any discussion of the text that is, in it' essence, a critical 
literary examination."). 
104. I refer here, most broadly, to analytical positivism such as the Austinian view of "command 
theory." SeeJOHN AuSTIN, THE PROVINCE OFJURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1832), reprinted in GEORGE C. 
CHRISTIE AND PATRICK H. MARTIN, JURISPRUDENCE 517-664 (2d ed. 1995). The same binding result 
would apply, for the narrow purpose of this article, through viewing the biblical text as natural law. 
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assume that they bear the meaning long held by believers. As Israeli Professor 
Eliah Leibowitz recently explained: 
[T]he interpretation adopted by the first generations to the biblical text has 
become, over the generations, almost inevitably identified with the text itself. 
Over the course of centuries, every other interpretative option was rendered 
obsolete, while the theistic meanings attributed to these stories became 
engraved in the readers' mind as the only plausible interpretation. lOS 
This cannot, of course, be our path here. Rather, adopting Leibowitz's 
view, we will consider this text, "like any written text, [to be] in the public 
domain [such that] anyone who wants to find out its meaning is allowed to do 
so." 106 We thus approach the Biblical text with an open mind and open heart. 
The second implication of viewing the Bible as a legal text is the applica­
tion of a legal interpretive framework. Much like legal scholars continue to 
debate the proper meaning of our Constitution, statutes, and laws, so should we 
approach the biblical text. First, however, we must determine the nature of the 
legal text at hand. Are the relevant biblical verses "constitutional" in nature? 
Statutory? Common law? What is their order in the hierarchical structure of 
the Biblical norms?107 While the text does not provide direct answer to these 
questions, it does provide some clues. For example, we could consider the Ten 
Commandments as the biblical equivalent of a constitution, or "the [s]upreme 
Law of the Land."108 If that is the case, then the verses in question here-and 
in particular the Levitical text, which was enacted following the Ten Command­
ments and pursuant to them-should be considered "statutory" in nature. How 
then should one approach a biblical "statutory" text? Generally speaking, such 
text should be approached like any other statutory text. Thus, while searching 
for its meaning, we must embark on an interpretive process before settling on 
one of the interpretive options. This option is never "self-evident." 109 This is 
especially true when the text in question, like here, is thousands of years old, 
quaint, and often cryptic. As James Madison so eloquently reminded us, even 
" [ w] hen the almighty himself condescends to address mankind in their own 
105. LEIBOWITZ, SUfJTa note 103, at 31 (Hebrew). 
106. Id. at 36. He continues: 
A written text is an independent entity, which existence no longer depends on the author. 
The meaning the text has, or that can be att1ibuted to the text-which is the art of literary 
interpretation--Oepends only on the internal parameters of the text itself, such as the order 
of the words, the grammatical structure, the choice of literary images and terms, and the 
language games found there .... The level of authority each interpretation carries has noth­
ing to do with how close the interpreter is to the author, including if the interpreter is the 
author itself .... Indeed, the author qua author has no advantage or priority as interpreter of 
the text over any other person. 
Id. at 36-37. 
107. For the hierarchical strncture of legal norms, see generally HANS KELSEN, THE PURE THEORY 
OF LAw 221-30 (Max Knight trans., 2d ed. 1967). 
108. See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause). The notion that the Ten Commandment' 
are of constitutional stature was adopted by at least two Israeli Supreme Court Justices, both known 
Jewish-Law scholars. See CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank v. Migdal 49(4) PD 221, 474 (1995) 
(Cheshin, J., dissenting) (Hebrew) (referring to the Ten Commandment' a' Jewish people's "first 
Constitution;" and concluding: "There was no doubt who has provided the People of Israel with their 
Constitution; there was no doubt in His authority to do so .... [T] here is no doubt that a Constitution 
has been given."); see also Elyakim Rubinstein, The Ten Commandments-Through the Ages and in Israeli 
Law, http://www.daat.ac.il/mishpat-iwi/skirot/108-2.htm (la5t visited Jan. 30, 2019) (discussing the 
"constitutional wonder" of the Ten Commandments) (Hebrew). 
109. See, e.g., AHARON BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN LAw 14 (2005) ("Even a plain text 
requires interpretation, and only interpretation allows us to conclude that its meaning is plain."). 
Barak is the most celebrated Israeli ChiefJustice, considered by many as "the Israeli CJ. Marshall." 
125 2019] RETHINKING RELIGIOUS OBJECTIONS TO SAMDSEX MARRIAGE 
language, His meaning, luminous as it must be, is rendered dim and doubtful 
by the cloudy medium through which it is communicated."110 
We can now begin our interpretive journey. The first step in searching for 
the proper meaning of the verses in question is the understanding that statu­
tory interpretation is a "holistic endeavor." 111 Indeed, "he who interprets one 
line of statutory text, interprets the entire legislative edifice."112 Accordingly, 
the biblical legal text, like any legal text, should be read in context.113 And 
context is important. 114 Biblical scholars who examined the verses relating to 
the regulation of same-sex intimacy agree wholeheartedly. 115 
What, then, is the proper context in which these biblical verses should be 
read? The proper context for these verses is the same context for the reading 
110. THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 197 Qames Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also Max 
Radin, Statutory lnterprP.f.alion, 43 HARV. L. REv. 863, 866 (1930) ("The interpretation of words is a 
familiar technique of philology and theology, or, perhaps we might say, of theological philology. 
Words are found which in the case of the Bible are deemed to be the utterances of God. They are 
therefore unchangeable, eternal, and precise in content. Inadvertence or mere approximation is 
excluded.") (footnote omitted). 
111. United Sav. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest A'<Socs., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988); see 
aLw Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) ("The plainness or ambiguity of statutory 
language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language 
is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole."); BARAK, supra note 109, at 353 ("The 
interpreter should assume harmony within the legislative project and should avoid severing a statutory 
provision from the totality of legislation. Whoever applies a single statute, applies the entirety of legis­
lation .... The various statutes in a system exist as integrated tools, like different limbs of a single 
body. The way the body as a whole functions indicates the tasks designated to each statute."); WILLIAM 
N. ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATlITORY INTERPRETATION 7 (1994) ("[S]tatutory interpretation is a holistic 
enterprise."). 
112. HCJ 693/91 Efrat v. Comm'r of Population Registry 47(1) PD 749 (1993) (Hebrew); see also 
King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2483 (2015) ("But oftentimes the meaning-or ambiguity-of certain 
words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context. So when deciding whether the 
language is plain, we must read the words in their context and with a view to their place in the overall 
statutory scheme.") (internal quotation marks omitted). 
113. See, e.g., Cont'! Can Co. v. Chi. Truck Drivers, 916 F.2d 1154, 1157 (7th Cir. 1990) ("You 
don't have to be Ludwig Wittgenstein or Hans-Georg Gadamer to know that successful communication 
depends on meaning shared by interpretive communities."); ANTONIN ScALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, 
READING LAw: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 167 (2012) ("Context is a primary determinant of 
meaning. A legal instrument typically contains many interrelated parts that make up the whole. The 
entirety of the document thus provides the context for each of its parts."); John F. Manning, What 
Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 GoLUM. L. REv. 70, 75 (2006) ("[M]odern textualists under­
stand that the meaning of statutory language (like all language) depends wholly on context."). 
114. See, e.g., Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ry,m, 293 U.S. 388, 439 (1935) (Cardozo,]., dissenting) ("[T]he 
meaning of a statute is to be looked for, not in any single section, but in all the parts together and in 
their relation to the end in view."); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 113, at 167 ("Perhaps no interpretive 
fault is more common than the failure to follow the whole-text cannon, which calls on the judicial 
interpreter to consider the entire text, in view of its structure and of the physical and logical relation 
of its many parts."). 
115. See, e.g., jAY MICHAEi.SON, Goo vs. GAY? THE RELIGIOUS CASE FOR EQUAL.ITV 57 (2011) ("Yes, 
context is important"); Bradley Shavit Artson, t,'nfranchising the Monogamous Homosexual: A Legal Possihil­
ity, a Moral Imperative, 3 S'VARA-jOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY &JUDAISM 15, 24 (1993) ("Context does have 
legal consequence. Whether or not homosexual act' take place in the context practiced in antiq­
uity ... or in a modern context ... similarly ought to have legal consequence. It ought to make a 
difference."); Goldie Milgram, What Does Judaism Have to Say about Homosexuality, Jewish Same-Sex Mar­
riages, and Ordination?, RECLAIMING JUDAISM, http:/ /www.reclaimingjudaism.org/teachings/what-does­
judaism-have-say-about-homosexuality-jewish-same-sex-marriages-and-ordination (last visited Dec. 20, 
2018) ("However, a verse doeth not a moral code make, verses must be seen in the context of their 
larger rubric and through the lens of the times in which we Jive."); see also jEFF MINER & JOHN T. 
GoNNOLEY, CHILDREN ARE FREE: REEXAMINING THE BIBLICAi. EVIDENCE ON SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIP 9-JO 
(2002) ("If we want to interpret spoken or written statements accurately, we must carefully study the 
context in which the statement' were made. Otherwise we can completely misunderstand what was 
intended. Theologians of all stripes (including the most fundamentalist) have Jong followed this rule 
when interpreting statements found in the Bible.... a text taken out of context is pretext .... [Citing 
the two Levi tical verses at issue, they add:] As we have seen above, if we wish to understand the true 
meaning of these verses, we must look at their context, both textual and historical."). 
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of all biblical verses: it is the entire Torah, or the whole Five Books. Indeed, 
much like ChiefJustice Marshall, we, too, are looking for a "fair construction of 
the whole instrument." 116 And the Torah has long since been considered a 
single legislative edifice, consisting of 613 laws. 117 That has been the under­
standing ofJewish Law for generations. There is no reason to deviate from that 
holistic approach when examining the verses at issue here. 
What is the meaning of reading a verse in the context of the entire Torah? 
Surely we cannot read the entire five books into the few verses in question. We 
need, rather, some organizing principles-some interpretive "lighthouses" to 
guide our way through the fog of interpretive options. 118 To be sure, the 
notion of using certain guiding principles when reading a legal text is not a 
novel idea; as Justice Frankfurter has reminded us, the correct contextual 
approach for every statute "demands awareness of certain suppositions.'>! 19 
What, then, are those "certain suppositions" when it comes to reading the 
Torah as a legal text? 
B. Three Organizing Princip!,es 
Of the many possible interpretive principles appearing in the Five Books, 
three are pertinent for reading any biblical text. These are the "organizing 
principles" of the Hebrew Bible. First among them is the principle that all per­
sons were created "in the image of God."120 Second is the principle, later 
adopted as the universal Golden Rule, requiring each of us to "Love thy Neigh­
bor as Yourself." 121 Third and final is the principle that the interpretation of 
the Torah is "not in Heaven," 122 but was rather rendered to humans, and is 
therefore a rational (rather than a theological) endeavor. I turn now to briefly 
introduce each of these principles. Such introduction is crucial, as each of the 
principles independently-let alone all three of them in the aggregate-casts 
serious doubt on the validity of the current interpretation of the verses in ques­
tion. Thus, the current view-according to which one should view same-sex 
intimacy as an abomination, a disgusting aberration of human behavior, and as 
immoral behavior-should be reexamined in light of these organizing princi­
ples. I introduce each of them in turn. 
1. imN N1:J. r:r;ii?N 1:J?~::i: In the Image of God He Created Him 
The very first Chapter of the First Book of Moses includes a divine-like 
description of the creation of mankind: 
1:J?~::i m?~::i 1:J1N;-J 11!\ O';-J'?l'\ l'\1J'1 ... 1J111~1J 1m?~::i 01!\ ;-J!L'llJ O';i'?l'\ 1~!\'1 
.0111!\ l'\1J ;-J::Jj?J1 1JT 1111!\ l'\1J 0':1'?N 
116. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (1. Wheat.) 316, 406 (1819). 
117. See Deuteronomy 33:4 ("Moses commanded us a law"). "Law" meant "Torah" in the Hebrew 
original. TALMUD BABYLON, Makkol 23:2 ("Six hundred and thirteen Mitzvot (laws) were ordered on 
Moshe; three hundred and sixty five 'do not,' as the number of days of the sun [year], and two hun­
dred forty eight 'do,' against the number of body parts in each person."). 
118. See Drucilla Cornell, From the Ughthouse: The Promise of Redemption and the Possibility of Legal 
Interpretation, in Lf:c:AI. HERMENEUTIC$-Hl~'TORY, THEORY, & PRAC'TIC:E 147, 161 (Gregory Leyh ed., 
1992) ("We can think of [an interpretive] principle as the light that comes from the lighthouse, a light 
that guides us and prevent' us from going in the wrong direction."). 
119. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statule.s, 4 7 CouJM. L. REV. 527, 537 
(1947); see also Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2088 (2014) ("Part of a fair reading of statutory 
text is recognizing that 'Congress legislates against the backdrop' of certain unexpressed presump­
tions.") (quoting EEOC v. Arnbian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)). 
120. Genesis I :27. 
121. Note that this guiding principle appears between the two verses in Leviticus-the one pro­
hibit' same-sex act,. See Leviticus 18:22. The other imposes a death penalty. See Levil.icus 20:13. 
122. Deuteronomy 30:12. 
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And God said, Let us make man [Adam] in our image, after our likeness.... So 
God created man [Adam] in his own image, in the image of God created he 
him; male and female created he them. 
The notion that every person was created in the image of God is one of the 
founding principles ofJewish thought. It serves as an interpretative organizing 
principle of the entire body of law known as Jewish Law. As Israeli Supreme 
Court Deputy Chief Justice Menachem Elon-Israel's preeminent Jewish Law 
scholar of the modern era123-has noted in one of his opinions: 
"In the image of God He created him," serves as both the theoretical and the 
philosophical foundation for the unique stand adopted by Jewish Law towards 
the sacredness of human life-the sacredness of the image of God with which 
every person is created-which is considered a supreme value. It is from that 
foundation that Halacha Uewish Law] derives many of its views on a wide variety 
of issues.124 
But it is not merely the sacredness of human life-every human life-that 
the opening verses of Genesis require us to honor; the notion that every person 
was created in the image of God also leads us to recognize the value of equality, 
and therefore dignity, with which every person should be treated. As Deputy 
Chief:Justice Elon noted in another case: 
One of the founding principles in the world of Jewish Law is the notion of 
human creation in the image of God (Gen. 1:27). The Torah opens by reciting 
this principle, and it is from there that the Halacha derives its most basic notions 
of human value, which is found in each person-every person, without exception-
as well as the requirement to treat every f1erson with equality and love. He [Rabbi 
Akiva] used to say: how pleasing is a man for being created in His image; an 
extreme pleasantness is attached to him by virtue of being created in the image 
[of God], as the Torah said (Gen. 9:6): "In the image of God he created man." 
Of great interest here is the debate between two of the most well-known 
Ta'naa'im regarding the human value that should govern in the relationship 
between one person and another: "And love your neighbor as yourself" (Lev. 
19:18) ... R. Akiva says: This is an essential rule of the Torah; while Ben Azai 
says: This is the story of the dawn of mankind ("in the day God created man, in 
the image of God he created him." (Gen. 5:1) )-this is even a more essential 
rule of the Torah. According to R. Akiva, in examining the relationship 
between one person and another, the primary value is the requirement to treat 
one another with love, and to love mankind. Conversely, according to Ben Azai, 
the primary value is that of human equality, as each and every person was cre­
ated in the image of God. But these two values-equality, and the love of mankind­
have 11Urrphed to establish the very foundatwn ofJewish Law throughout the ages. 125 
OtherJewish Law scholars have noted the sacred bond between being born 
in the image of God and equality. 126 But "In God's image" goes even further 
123. See Menachem Elon, Jewish Law: History, Sources, Principles Vol. I-IV (2003). The late 
Justice Rabbi Menachem Elon, who also served as a law professor at the Hebrew University Law School 
and at NYU Law School, is best known as the author of this monumental work. 
124. CA 506/88 Shefer v. State of Israel 48(1) PD l, 36 (1993), http://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/ 
sites/default/files/upload/opinions/Shefer%20v.%20State%20of%20Israel.pdf (author translation). 
125. CA 2/88 Neiman v. Chairman of the Election Comm. 39(2) PD 225, 298 (1985) (Hebrew) 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted). Cf Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 218-19 (1986) (Stevens, 
]., dissenting) ("Although the meaning of the principle that 'all men are created equal' is not always 
clear, it surely must mean that every free citizen has the same interest in 'liberty' that the members of 
the majority share. From the standpoint of the individual, the homosexual and the heterosexual have 
the same interest in deciding how he will live his own life, and, more narrowly, how he will conduct 
himself in his personal and voluntary associations with his companions. State intrusion into the pri­
vate conduct of either is equally burdensome."). 
126. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, In Cod's Image: The ReligWus Imperative ofEquality Under Law, 99 
CoLUM. L. REv. 1608, 1616 (1999) ("Both of these ideas of Genesis I-the act of creation ex nihilo 
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than mere equality; it portends that every person enjoys the sacred-and 
legal-right to human dignity.127 As Israeli Supreme Court Chief Justice 
Aharon Barak has noted: 
Human Dignity has deep roots in Jewish Law. It occupies a special place in 
Jewish thought. According to the world of Jewish Law, all the dignity in the 
world was delegated from the creator, who is the King of Dignity ("Melech 
Ha'Kavod"). Human dignity is derived from the dignity of God, because all 
humans were created in the image of God: "And God created man in his own 
image; in the image of God He created him." (Gen. 1:27) ... Human dignity 
means that the image of God, which exists in every person, should not be vio­
lated. Indeed, human dignity-or, as it is sometimes known as "the dignity of 
persons"-is a central tenet of Jewish Law.... According to Jewish Law, the 
starting point for other people's dignity is your own dignity, as viewed by your­
self; the dignity of your neighbor should be equal-in your own eyes-to 
yours.12s 
Another noted Jewish Law scholar, Justice Haim Cohen, who also served as 
Deputy Chief-Justice of the Israeli Supreme Court, further elaborated on the 
link between the two: 
In the spectrum of Jewish-Law values, human dignity is second only to God's 
dignity; but just below that divine dignity, and right beside it, the notion of 
human dignity-sometimes known as "the dignity of persons"-has occupied a 
central place all on its own. Not only has human dignity received divine author­
ity, its very existence is a necessary conclusion of the creation story by which a 
person was created "in the image of" or "the likeness of" God. Rabbi Akiva's 
statement, "how pleasing is a man for being created in His image; an extreme 
pleasantness is attached to him by virtue of being created in the image of God," 
was later described as "a founding principle in our sages' understanding of the 
value of every human being. The dignity of persons is a necessary conclusion 
from the fondness that God feels towards each person."129 
So central is the notion of human dignity to Jewish Law that the Talmud 
went so far as declaring it "supersedes a negative commandment of the 
Torah." 130 Based on that lesson, human dignity has been used in a variety of 
and the principle of creation in the image of God-are central to understanding the moral force of 
the proposition that all men are created equal."). 
127. To properly understand the notion of dignity, see IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE 
METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 102 (HJ. Paton trans., 1964) (1785) ("In the kingdom of ends everything has 
either a price or a dignity. If it has a price, something else can be put in its place a' an equivalent, if it is 
exalted above all price and so admits of no equivalent, then it has a dignity."). 
128. AHARON BARAK, INTERPRETATION IN LAw, Vol.. Ill: CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 404-05 
(1994) (Hebrew). The link between those two concept,-God's image and human dignity-is not 
unique to Judaism, of course. See, e.g., Christopher Mccrudden, Human Dignity and judicial Interpreta­
tiim of Human Rights, 19 EuR.]. INT'L L. 655, 658 (2008) ("The Catechism of the Catholic Church 
incorporates this idea of Man as made in the image of God as central to it' conception of human 
dignity."). 
129. HAIM H. CoHN, BE1Nc:Jrn1sH 419 (2005) (Hebrew). Before serving in the Israeli Supreme 
Court, Dr. Cohn served as Israel's first Attorney-General. In this capacity, he was charged with enforc­
ing the laws-mostly those left behind by the British rule-including the law against same-sex act,. 
Haim Cohn instructed the Israeli Police not to enforce that law. Much later in life, Cohn, who was 
born and raised in Germany, reflected on this episode: 
I was of the opinion that it was my duty not to enforce a law I considered to be amoral. We 
have demanded the German Judges to not enforce the Nazi laws, which they considered 
amoral. And I think this duty applies to everyJudge and every Attorney-General who should 
never assist in executing laws which, by their conscience, are considered amoral. 
M1c11AEL SHESHAR, HA1M Co1m-SuPREME GoURT jusnn:: CONVERSATIONS ( 1989) (Hebrew). 
130. TALMUD BABYl.ON, Berachot 19b. For an elaborate discussion, see ELIOTT N. DoRFF ET AL., 
RABBINICAL AssEMBLY, HoMosEXUAI.rrv, HUMAN D1cN1TY, & HAtAKHAH: A COMBINED REsroNSUM FOR 
THE CoMM!TfEE ONjE\\1SH LAw /\ND STANDARDS 10 (2006), http://www.rabbinicalassembly.org/sites/ 
defauIt/ ti!es/pubIic/ha!akhah/ teshuvot/ 2005201 0 /do rfl:._nevins_reisner_dignity. pdf. 
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Halachic contexts-from letting a wedding ceremony proceed on Shabbat,131 
to allowing women to read Torah in public. 132 
The biblical principle of human dignity entails other legal implications as 
well. In particular, it was invoked (by the Israeli Supreme Court) to rule on a 
variety of constitutional issues, including the dignity of same-sex couples.133 
For example, in 1994, the Court held that the same-sex partner of an airline 
employee cannot be discriminated against in terms of workplace benefits due to 
his sexual orientation. 134 Later, the Israeli Court recognized as legal an adop­
tion made by a same-sex couple-first in California, 135 and then in Israel. 136 
Finally, although in Israel marriages ofJewish couples may still be conducted 
only in accordance with Orthodox Jewish Law137 (which prohibits same-sex 
marriage), the Israeli Supreme Court was willing to recognize, and then legally 
register, same-sex marriage as long as they were legally recognized in the juris­
diction in which they were conducted.138 
The notion of human dignity was also prominent in U.S. Supreme Court 
same-sex jurisprudence, and for the same reasons. It was Justice Kennedy­
again, a practicing Catholic139-who introduced the notion of human dignity 
into to discussion of same-sex intimacy. For example, ruling that same-sex acts 
cannot be considered a criminal offense, Justice Kennedy wrote: 
It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon this 
[same-sex] relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private 
lives and still retain their dignity as free persrms. When sexuality finds overt expres­
sion in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one ele­
ment in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the 
Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice. 140 
Ten years later, in United States v. Windsor, 141 Justice Kennedy relied heavily 
on the notion of human dignity to strike down Article 3 of DOMA, which 
defined the term "marriage" as applying only to heterosexual couples. Time 
and again, Justice Kennedy emphasized the notion of human dignity as stand­
ing at the core of his decision to hold the section unconstitutional. 142 Memora­
bly, he noted that the "history of DOMA's enactment and its own text 
131. Shabbat-theJewish rest day-is usually reserved for prayer only. No other activity (includ­
ing wedding ceremonies) is allowed. For that and other human dignity exceptions to the strict Shab­
bat rule. See generally Nahum Rakover, Human Dignity, DAAT, http://www.daat.ac.il/daat/kitveyet/ 
shana/kvod-4.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2019) (Hebrew). 
132. See Daniel Sperber, Congregal.ianal Dignity and Human Dignily: Women and Public Torah Read­
ing, 3 EDAH j. 2 (2002). 
133. It is important to note that the right to human dignity was written into Israeli Basic Law in 
1992. See Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752-1992, SH No. 1454 p. 90 (as amended); BARAK, 
supra note 128, at 403-569. 
134. HCJ 721/94 El-AI Israeli Airlines v. Danilovich 48(5) PD 749 (1994). 
135. HGJ 1799/99 Berner-Kadish v. Ministry of the Interior 54(2) PD 368 (2000). 
136. CA 10280/01 Yaros-Hakak v. Att'y General 59(5) PD 64 (2005). 
137. See The Rabbinical Court jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law, 5713-1953, 7 LSI I 39, 
§ 2 (1953) (lsr.) ("Marriage and divorce ofJewish people in the State of Israel will only be conducted 
in accordance with the Laws of the Torah."); Israeli Government CklSMS with Liberal Jewish Streams, Ass0­
CIATED PRESS Uuly 22, 2015), http://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/22072015 ("Israel's Ortho­
dox rabbinical establishment wields a monopoly over key aspects of daily life, such as marriage, divorce 
and burials. Reform and Conservative rabbis are not recognized, and their movements are largely 
marginalized. Most Jews in Israel, while secular, follow Orthodox traditions."). 
138. HCJ 3045/05 Ben-Ari v. Dir. of Population Admin. 61(3) PD 283 (2006); see also Yuval 
Merin, Anglo-American Choice of Law and the Recognition ofForeign Same-Sex Marriages in Israel-On Relig­
ious Norms and Secular Reforms, 36 BROOK]. INT'L L. 509 (2011). 
139. See supra Section I.A. 
140. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (emphasis added). 
141. See 570 U.S. 744 (2013). 
142. The term "human dignity," including its several derivations, is mentioned no less than 
twenty-four times in Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court. 
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demonstrate that interference with the equal dignity of same-sex marriages, a dig­
nity conferred by the States in the exercise of their sovereign power, was more 
than an incidental effect of the federal statute. It was its essence." 143 
Two years later, in Obergefell, the notion of human dignity was featured 
prominently in the decision to recognize a constitutional right to same-sex mar­
riage.144 Memorably, the opinion of the Court concludes with the following 
statement: "[Petitioners] ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Con­
stitution grants them that right."145 
Indeed, the notion of human dignity, together with its Jewish-Law corol­
lary, the notion that every person was created in the image of God, are simply 
incongruent with the current interpretation of the biblical text relating to 
same-sex intimacy. It cannot stand to reason that the same Bible that crowned 
each person as the child of God, allowed a certain group to become a target of 
ridicule, persecution, and discrimination simply due to their love object. 
Indeed, both the Israeli and U.S. Supreme Courts have arrived at that conclu­
sion. Several Jewish commentators have found the tension irreconcilable.146 
The time has come to introduce "in God's image" into the "religious-objection" 
debate. 
2. l1~:::i llli'? n::i;-i~i: Love Your Neighbor as Yourself 
The second organizing principle that governs interpretation of all Biblical 
verses is the notion that each of us should treat the other in the same manner 
we would have liked to be treated. Nestled between the two same-sex intimacy 
Levitical verses discussed earlier-the alleged prohibition against same-sex acts 
(Lev. 18:22), and the death penalty for their performance (Lev. 20:13)-lies 
the seminal principle of "thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." 147 As we have 
143. Windrnr, 570 U.S. at 770 (emphasis added); see also id. at 769 ("By its recognition of the 
validity of same-sex marriages performed in other jurisdictions and then by authorizing same-sex 
unions and same-sex marriages, New York sought to give furtherjrrolection and dignity to that bond. For 
same-sex couples who wished to be married, the State acted to give their lawful conduct a lawful status. 
This status is a far-reaching legal acknowledgment of the intimate relationship between two people, a 
relationship deemed by the State worthy of dignity in the community equal with all other marriages. It 
reflect' both the community's considered perspective on the historical roots of the institution of mar­
riage and its evolving understanding of the meaning of equality.") (emphasis added). Cf MICHAEL]. 
SANDEL,jusncE: WHAT'S THF, RIGHT THING TO Do? 254 (2007) ("The debate over same-sex marriage is 
fundamentally a debate about whether g-ay and lesbian unions are worthy of the honor and recogni­
tion that, in our society, state-sanctioned marriage confers."). 
144. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596 (2015) ("Until the mid-20th century, same-sex 
intimacy long had been condemned as immoral by the state itself in most Western nations, a belief 
often embodied in the criminal law. For this reason, among others, many persons did not deem 
homosexuals to have dignity in their mvn distinct identity. A truthful declaration by same-sex couples of 
what was in their heart' had to remain unspoken. Even when a greater awareness of the humanity and 
integrity of homosexual persons came in the period after World War II, the argument that gays and 
lesbians had a just claim to dignity was in conflict with both law and widespread social conventions. Same­
sex intimacy remained a crime in many States. Gays and lesbians were prohibited from most govern­
ment employment, barred from military service, excluded under immigration laws, targeted by police, 
and burdened in their rights to associate.") (emphasis added). 
145. Id. at 2608. 
146. See, e.[;., REBECCA A1.PCRT, LIKE BREAD ON THE SEDER P1xn:: J E'A1SII LESBIANS AND THE TRANS­
FORMATION OF TRADITION 19-20 (1998) ("We must add1·ess the question of how le.,bians can live a' 
Jews when the sacred text that tells us we were created in God's image also tells us that male homosex­
ual acts are punishable by death and that the lesbian acts are a'5ociated with 'the practice of EgypL' 
These are contradictory notions: if God created all human beings in the divine image, then men who 
love men and women who love women mLL>t also be part of the divine plan."); see also id. at 39 ("Con­
temporary commentators see a contradiction between Leviticus 18:22 and the idea as stated in Genesis 
that we were all created in God's image. This contradiction must be resolved. We must assume that 
those of us who were created lesbian and gay are also in God's image, and that acts central to our 
identity cannot therefore be an abomination."). 
147. Leviticus 19:18. 
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seen, the great Rabbi Akiva-on whom the Talmud teaches that Moshe himself 
could learn Torah from 148-declared this principle "an essential rule of the 
Torah."149 This principle is universally accepted today, known across both reli­
gions and cultures as the Golden Rule. 150 Not only does it serve as one of the 
Torah's leading interpretive principles, it also said to encompass the entire 
Torah in one sentence. That, according to the famous story-perhaps the most 
famous of all Jewish-Law stories-about Rabbi Hillel: 
One day, a non~ew came before Shamai [Hillel's counter-part, a strict construc­
tionist] and told him: Please convert me [to Judaism] so that you can teach me 
the entire Torah while I'm standing on one leg. He [Shamai, in response] 
pushed the man away, using the building rod he was holding. Afterwards, [that 
same person] came before Hillel with the same exact request. He [Hillel] told 
him [in Aramaic]: Whatever is hateful to you, do not do to your neighbor. This 
is the entire Torah, and all the rest is commentary. Now get out and study! 151 
Beyond the genius-and ingenuity-of condensing the Five Books of 
Moses to a single sentence, Hillel's formula is important to consider as an 
organizing interpretive principle. As Rabbi Telushkin has noted: "The fact that 
Hillel is willing to offer so brief an explanation-fifteen words in the popularly 
spoken Aramaic-indicates that there is. a central focus to his understanding of 
Judaism, one that provides him with a standard that lat,er enables him to modify certain 
Torah laws in a manner that will shock other rabbis." 152 
Using the standard of the Golden Rule, it is easy to conclude that no per­
son-let alone a group-should be discriminated against solely on the basis of 
their love object. Indeed, if we consider the duty of treating each other with 
the same dignity and respect we accord to ourselves, surely we cannot expect 
the "other" (or others) to be constantly diminished, harassed, or persecuted for 
no reason other than their sexual orientation. Indeed, in general philosophical 
discourse, the Golden Rule has been invoked frequently in relation to social 
equality. As Thomas Nagel explained: 
You are to ask not just "What shall I do?" but "What should anyone in my posi­
tion do?" and the answer comes from subjecting your conduct to standards 
acceptable from everyone's point of view at once, or the points of view of all 
those affected-suitably idealized and combined. 
. . . [T]his interpretation identifies the core of Kantian morality with some 
form of equal consideration for all persons, as a limit on the pursuit of one's own 
interests-not by maximizing aggregate welfare as utilitarianism requires, but by 
mandating certain forms of decent treatment of each person individually.153 
The need to provide "decent treatment of each person individually," as 
Nagel puts it, must entail the need for non-discrimination of persons on the 
basis of their sexual orientation. A biblical text that puts the interpretive princi­
ple of Love Your Neighbor front and center would be hard-pressed to be recon­
ciled with the notion of such blunt discrimination. Therefore, one should 
make every interpretive effort to avoid such incongruent result. As Jay Michael­
son observed, "(t]here need be no contradiction between the commandment to 
148. See TALMUD BABYLON, Minchol 29:2. 
149. The source of this quote is not identified. 
150. See, e.g., Col.den Rule, THE OXFORD CoMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 321 (Ted Honderich ed., 
1995). 
151. TALMUD BABYLON, Shahbat 31a. 
152. JOSEPH TELUSllKJN, HILLEL-IF NOT Now, WHEN? 19-20 (2010) (emphasis added). 
153. Thoma' Nagel, The Ta.slefor Being Moral, N.Y. REv. BooKS (Dec. 6, 2012) (emphasis added), 
https:/ /www.nybooks.com/articles/2012/12/06/taste-being-moral/. 
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love our neighbors as ourselves and the handful of biblical verses that have 
troubled us for so long."154 
3. "N';-J O'~IVJ N'?": "It is Not in the Heavens" 
The third and final organizing principle is "it is not in the heavens." While 
slightly more cryptic than the first two principles, it is no less important, and 
perhaps even more influential, in understanding the Biblical text. It appears 
only in the last of the Five Books, Deuteronomy, almost as a concluding remark 
to the entire interpretive edifice. There, the author pauses to remind us of the 
obvious: while Biblical laws were written by divine authority, they are meant to 
be followed-and therefore be interpreted-by ordinary people. For that rea­
son, these laws are written in a way that can and should be understood by such 
people. Then the author adds an important caveat, warning us about the inter­
pretive authority that should guide us while trying to understand Biblical 
commands: 
For this commandment [law] which I command thee this day, it is not hidden 
from thee, neither is it far off. It is not in heaven, that though shouldest say, 
Who shall go up for us to heaven, and bring it unto us, that we may hear it, and 
do it? Neither is it beyond the sea, that though shouldest says, Who shall go over 
the sea for us, and bring it unto us, that we may hear it, and do it? But the word 
is very nigh unto thee, in thy mouth, and in thy heart, that though mayest do 
it.155 
The Torah itself, in other words, tells us that each of us is responsible for 
reading it, understanding it, and following it on our own. In fact, it warns us 
explicitly about those self-proclaimed religious "authorities" who vow they have 
a direct access to the heavenly interpretation or to another divine inspiration. 
There is no point and no reason, says the Torah, to ascend to the heavens, or to 
cross the high seas (an enormous feet back when the text was written) to 
achieve the interpretive result; rather, much like with Dorothy's ultimate reali­
zation, the answer is already here, in our minds and in our hearts. 
The notion that biblical interpretation is not a heavenly task but rather an 
earthly mission should serve as an important interpretive insight.156 It allows, 
essentially, every person to approach the text on their own terms. It suggests 
that no person-regardless of their religious pedigree-is "above" others or 
better equipped to understand the biblical text. Even further, the principle can 
be used to show why the Bible seeks a "dynamic," rather than static, interpreta­
tion: if its words are open to interpretation by every generation, with its own 
readers on their own terms, surely different generations may view the same text 
differently. Much in the form William Eskridge espoused for all statutory 
law, 157 biblical interpretive journey cannot "freeze" at the time the Torah was 
written. Rather, it should accord itself to current moral and social needs: "God 
gave the Torah ... on Mount Sinai. Subsequently God relinquished the right 
154. MICHAELSON, supra note 115, at 56. 
155. Deuteronomy 30:11-14; see also ETZ HAYJM: TORAH AND COMMENTARY 1170-71 (2001) 
("Surely, this Instruction which I enjoin upon you this day is not too baffling for you, nor is it beyond 
reach. It is not in the heavens, that you should say, 'Who among us can go up to the heavens and get it 
for us and impart it to us, that we may observe it?' Neither is it beyond the sea .... No, the thing is 
very close to you, in your mouth and in your heart, to observe it.") (verse numbers omitted). 
156. See, e.g.,.JAsoN P. RosENBLATT &JosEPH C. SITTERSON, JR., NoT IN HEAVEN: CoH£RENcE AND 
CoMPLEXl"lY IN BIBLICAL NARRATIVE I (1991) (noting that "the[se] three bare words themselves [may] 
authoriz[e] the independent, earthbound, arguments of literary critics"). 
157. See William N. Eskridge.Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation (1994). For an application of 
Eskridge's interpretive theory to same-sex intimacy laws, see Heidi A. Sorensen, A New Gay Rights 
Agenda? Dynamic Statutory Interpretation arui Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 81 GEO. Lj. 2105 (1993). 
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to interpret and change the law. This responsibility was given by God to the 
sages of each generation who were charged with interpreting the law according 
to the needs and problems of their own time."158 
The awesome responsibility that comes with assuming a novel interpreta­
tion-an interpretation that may, in some instances, contravene the original 
meaning of the text-did not escape Jewish-law sages. Yet they insisted that the 
authority of interpretation should remain with the people, rather than at the 
hands of an assumed "God." That view held firm even at the site of alleged 
Divine presence. This is, in essence, the well-known story of Achnai's Oven. It 
begins with a Halachic dispute over the Kashrut (Jewish appropriateness) of an 
oven that was found unclean. On one end of the dispute stood Rabbi Elazar, a 
major authority on Jewish Law; on the other, a group of rabbis, led by Rabbi 
Joshua, who-merely due to their number-constituted a majority opinion. 
Rabbi Elazar, however, was not willing to surrender to the majority so easily: 
After failing to convince the Rabbis logically, Rabbi Eliezer said to them: If 
the halakha is in accordance with my opinion, this carob tree will prove it. The 
carob tree was uprooted from its place one hundred cubits .... The Rabbis said 
to him: One does not cite halakhic proof from the carob tree. Rabbi 
Eliezer then said to them: If the halakha is in accordance with my opinion, the 
stream will prove it. The water in the stream turned backward and began flow­
ing in the opposite direction. They said to him: One does not cite halakhic 
proof from a stream .... 
Rabbi Eliezer then said to them: If the halakha is in accordance with my 
opinion, Heaven will prove it. A Divine Voice emerged from Heaven and said: 
Why are you differing with Rabbi Eliezer, as the halakha is in accordance with 
his opinion in every place that he expresses an opinion? 
Rabbi Yehoshua stood on his feet and said: It is written: "It is not in 
heaven" .... Since the Torah was already given at Mount Sinai, we do not 
regard a Divine Voice, as You already wrote at Mount Sinai, in the Torah: "After 
a majority to incline." Since the majority of Rabbis disagreed with Rabbi 
Eliezer's opinion, the halakha is not ruled in accordance with his opinion .... 
The Holy One, Blessed be He, smiled and said: My children have triumphed 
over Me; My children have triumphed over Me.159 
This Divine recognition-extremely unique in the annals ofJewish Law­
that "My children have triumphed over Me," is designed to send a strong mes­
sage to those who claim that they, and only they, "speak the words of God." For 
according to this story, it only takes a majority of mostly unidentified sages, who 
present an intellectually-defensible interpretive option, to overcome any other 
interpretive opinion-even that of God Himself. 160 Surely, if this is the case 
when it comes to God, it must be true for all of His purported 
representatives. 161 
158. Jacob A. Moss & Rivka B. Kern Ulmer, "Two Men Under One Cloak"-The Sages Permit it: 
Homosexual Marriage in Judaism, 55 J. HOMOSEXUAL11Y 71, 78 (2008). 
159. TALMUD BAvLI, Bava Metzia 59b, https://www.sefaria.org/Bava_Metzia.59b?lang=bi; see also 
Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Akhna~ 1997 UTAH L. REV. 309. 
160. As Israeli Supreme CourtJustice Moshe Silberg have noted, commenting on this story: "If 
the law is to follow a majority, one must act in accordance with this law, even if the on involved in 
litigation is the giver of the Torah Himself." Izhak Englard, Majority Decision vs Individual Truth-The 
Interpretation of "Oven of Achnai" Hagada, 15 TRADITION: J. ORTHODOX .JEWISll THOUGHT 137, 139 
(1975). 
161. The notion that the sages, rather than purported "prophets" are the binding authority in 
Judaism has long root. See, e.g., Maimonides (Rambam), Introduction to the Interpretation of the Mishna, 
DAAT, http://www.daat.ac.il/daat/mahshevt/hakdama/2-2.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2019) ("For it 
already has been said, (Deut. 30) It is Not in the Heavens. And the Lord, Blessed is He, has ordered us 
not to study from the prophets, but rather to learn from the sages, people of knowledge, reason, and 
opinion.") (Hebrew). 
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The interpretive principle of "Not in the Heavens" has been used exten­
sively by Jewish Law. 162 It may easily be applied in the context of same-sex 
marriage as well; in fact, it already has. 163 
In considering a new interpretative meaning to Biblical same-sex intimacy 
according to this principle, in particular one that deviates from (and in fact 
opposes) previous understandings of the text, one should consider the social 
costs associated with the current understanding. We have demonstrated, if only 
in a nutshell, the tremendous damage caused to the LGBT community as a 
result of the current interpretation. 164 But as Rabbi Dorff and others have 
noted, even without the immense social costs, the current understanding of the 
text borders on the absurd, in that it demands every LGBT person to do the 
impossible-lead a life of complete celibacy without ever choosing it: 
[T]he premise of [the demand of everyJewish person to become holy to God) is 
that it is essentially possible .... The Torah is possible-it is the gift of life, not a 
path for suffering and destruction of the physical self .... In demanding that 
observant homosexuals avoid all sexual contact for life, [however,] the halakhah 
is not asking for heroism but inviting failure. 165 
And in urging his fellow rabbis to better conform today's same-sex norms 
to the majority-accepted biblical interpretation, Rabbi Gordon Tucker included 
the following warning: 
The law is given cogency and support by the ongoing story of the community 
that seeks to live by the law. This is true no Jess for religious than for secular 
communities, and it is precisely what Robert Cover had in mind when he wrote 
that "for every constitution there is an epic." The ongoing, developing religious 
life of a community includes not only the work of its legalists, but also its exper­
iences, its intuitions, and the ways in which its stories move it. This ongoing relig­
ious life must therefore have a role in the development of its norms, else the legal 
obligations of the community will become dangerously detached from its theo­
logical commitments. 166 
Indeed, if the interpretation of the verses regarding same-sex intimacy is 
"Not in the Heavens," we must make every effort to seek one that is congruent 
with current social norms, as well as with the other organizing principles of the 
162. For a review, see Shimon Kalman, 'It ls Not in the Heavens'-And the Rule of Law, 203 
HA'MA'A'YAN 49 (2013) (Hebrew). 
163. See Moss & Kern Ulmer, supra note 158, at 78. 
164. See supra Section J.C.; see also Dhruv Khullar, Stigma Against Gay People Can Be Deadly, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/I0/09/well/live/gay-lesbian-lgbt-health-stigma­
laws.html ("For decades, we've known that LGBT individuals experience a range of social, economic, 
and health disparities--often the result of culture of laws and policies that treat them as lesser human 
beings .... LGBT youth are three times as likely to contemplate suicide, and nearly five times as likely 
to attempt suicide."). 
lfi5. DoRFF, supra note 130, at 9. 
166. Rabbi Gordon Tucker, Halakhic and Metaha/akhic Arguments Concerningjudaism and Homosex­
uality, in RABBINICAL AssEMBLY 19 (2006), https://www.rabbinicala.ssembly.org/sites/default/files/ 
public/halakhah/teshuvot/20052010/tucker_homosexuality.pdf (citing Robert Cover, Nomos and Nar­
rative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 ( 1983) (emphasis added)). For a nuanced articulation on the connection 
between professor Cover's seminal article and same-sex marriage, see jay Michaelson, Chaos, Law, and 
God: The Religious Meaning of Honwsexuality, 15 M IC:H. J. GENDER & L. 41, 113 (2008) ("In a Coverian 
sense, law is it~elf a religious force, even laws which, fro1n a conventional perspective ... are entirely 
secular in nature. This is especially true because, for Cover, law is 'a system of tension or a bridge 
linking a concept of a reality to an imagined alternative.' In other words, law does not merely regu­
late; it a.spires, connects the 'is' to the 'ought.' Thus to simply maintain that same-sex marriage is a 
species of pluralistic value of 'live and let live' is to ignore the fact that that value is, itself, a religious 
value ... that, when applied to religious questions such as marriage, is a theological argument. 'Live 
and let live' denies the a~pirational intent of religious law, or at least, replaces one nomian aspiration 
with another.") (footnote omitted) (quoting Robert Cover, Nomos and Narratives, 97 HARV. L. REv. 4, 4 
(1983)). 
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biblical text-those of human dignity, equality, and tolerance towards all 
humanity. To that we turn now. 
III. RETHINKING RELIGIOUS OBJECTIONS 
Armed with the new interpretive toolkit, we now return to the passages 
introduced earlier167 as the three current basis for Old-Testament based relig­
ious objections to same-sex intimacy. We examine each passage and conclude 
that the current "isolated-text" interpretation should be set aside in favor of an 
interpretive result that is contextually-based, is fully congruent with the three 
interpretive organizing principles, and is much more fair. We conclude with a 
call for a change of heart. 
A. Rethinking the Story of Creation 
According to the religious-objection argument, Genesis' Creation Story is 
only about "Adam and Eve, not Adam and Steve." It is about procreation, not 
intimacy qua intimacy. And it is about marriage between a man and a woman, 
not between two men. Thus, the Creation Story exalts the virtues of only one 
sexual paradigm. Clearly, therefore, it denounces all other paradigms of sexual 
relations, particularly those relating to same-sex. 
There is one glaring issue with this argument: its assumptions-as many 
and as established as they appear-fail to lead to the conclusion. In fact, they 
lead nowhere near it. While it is correct to assume that the text speaks in favor 
of one paradigm of sexual behavior, nowhere does is suggest that it speaks 
against another. Indeed, the Bible may favor other forms of sexuality as well, it 
may be neutral towards them, or it may denounce them. Textual support is 
needed to establish any of these conclusions. But the "argument by omission" 
as presented here without textual support is extremely dangerous to make, 
especially in light of its dire social costs. Moreover, in light of several interpre­
tive options-which remain open when the text, as here, is silent-we must, as 
we have seen, prefer an interpretation that is more congruent with the organiz­
ing principles; an interpretation that aligns itself with human dignity, with 
equality, with love for one another, and with current social norms. None of 
these notions lead to the interpretive result espoused by the religious 
argument. 
The weakness of the Creation Story argument has been keenly observed 
recently by several leading theologians. Jeffrey Siker, for example, noted that 
such "argument from silence" is one of the weakest forms of argument.168 
Daniel Helminiak went even further, arguing that, 
[T] he Adam-and-Eve-not-Adam-and-Steve argument depends on a logical fal­
lacy-the ad ignarantian argument, argument by appeal to the unknown, argu­
ment based on assumptions about what was not said. The argument runs like 
this: since the Bible does not actively support homosexuality, it must be that the 
Bible condemns it. But this conclusion does not logically follow. What would 
follow is simply that we do not know the biblical mind on the subject .... An 
endorsement of heterosexuality would imply a condemnation of homosexuality 
only if the two were mutually exclusive, and either-or choice .... But such a 
choice is not realistic .... Obviously, then, [for those who make the argument) 
167. See supra Section J.B. 
168. Jeffrey S. Siker, How to Decide? Homosexual Christians, the Bible, and Gentile Inclusion, 51 THE­
OLOGY TODAY 219, 226 (19Y4). 
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their opinion does not depend on the Bible. On the contrary, their reading of 
the Bible depends on their personal opinion.169 
And Peter Gomes observed: 
The creation story in Genesis does not pretend to be a history of anthropology 
or of every social relationship. It does not mention friendship, for example, and 
yet we do not assume that friendship is condemned [by the Bible] or abnor­
mal .... The creation story is the basis and not the end of human diversity, and 
thus to regard it as excluding everything it does not mention is to place too great 
a burden on the text and its writers, and too little responsibility upon the intelli­
gence of the readers, and on the varieties of human experience. 170 
Even beyond the direct disproving of the "argument by omission," one can­
not separate the Genesis story from the context in which it appears. That con­
text-the heterosexual marital model appearing in the Book of Genesis-is 
morally questionable by many of today's standards. For example, the First 
Father, Abraham, had one wife and one concubine who bore his first child. 171 
His grandson, Jacob, had two wives and two concubines who bore his many 
children; 172 more importantly, these two wives were sisters. 173 Surely those who 
argue in the name of Genesis' heterosexual model would not espouse such mar­
riage structures today. But Genesis, as a whole, either represents the only 
proper way for marriage (including the marriage of siblings), or it merely dem­
onstrates some models of marriage, while omitting the discussion of others. 
There could be no logical third way. 
The inescapable conclusion is that the "Adam and Eve, not Adam and 
Steve" argument cannot hold. It has no textual support. It ignores the Genesis­
marriage context. It wishes to learn much-too much-from omission. And it 
goes directly against the three interpretive organizing principles. The more rea­
sonable interpretation of the Creation Story is that it presents one model of sex­
ual relations. To be sure, this is an extremely important model, one that 
guarantees the continuity of the human race (a crucial consideration at the 
time of a nascent society). Moreover, until today, by far most couples follow the 
model of heterosexual marriage (statistically speaking). 174 The Genesis model 
described in the Story of Creation is therefore not in danger, even 3,000 years 
after being introduced. It still stands, today, as a wonderful manifestation of 
heterosexual love. There is no need, no reason, and no good justification to 
load it with negative implications as well. 
B. Rethinking the Tak of Sodom 
According to the religious-objection argument, the Tale of Sodom demon­
strates God's moral opprobrium towards homosexual relations. The all-male 
mob surrounding Lot's home wanted to "know"-i.e., to have sexual inter­
course with-the two male guests. Such behavior, the argument goes, was con­
sidered so abhorrent in the eyes of the Lord that He destroyed the city and all 
its residents because of it. Today we, too, should condemn such behavior; in 
fact, we should name it "sodomy" and proscribe it by law. 
169. HELMINIAK, supra note 89, at 101-02. 
170. GoMES, supra note 74, at 150. 
171. See GeTU'sis 17:1-4. 
172. See id. at 30:1-13. 
173. See id. at 29:20-27. 
174. According to Judge Posner, at most only four percent of the population, at most, are homo­
sexuals. See Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 668 (7th Cir. 2014) ("No one knows exactly how many 
Americans are homosexual. Estimates vary from about 1.5 percent to about 4 percent."). 
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Much like the Creation Story, however, the Tale of Sodom has not a shred 
of textual support. The issue before us is the biblical attitude towards adult, 
consensual, and voluntary sexual acts of intimacy between same-sex partners. 
This story is so far removed from this model-and this issue-that it is hard to 
contemplate how it has ever become the basis for any serious argument, let 
alone centuries-old criminal punishment, against same-sex intimacy. The Tale 
of Sodom discusses (the threat of) rape, not consensual, voluntary relations. It 
discusses a mob, not a loving, single partner. And it discusses all that after God 
has already noted-and informed Abraham-that "thei,r sin is so grave,"175 which 
means that the decision to eviscerate the city had very little to do with their last 
act of wickedness. 176 
Note how far removed this story is from a reasonably-understood restric­
tion on same-sex intimacy. First, it says nothing about such behavior when con­
ducted between two consenting adults. Second, even if a single person would 
have wanted to "know" these guests against their will, this would still constitute 
rape. But this story not about a single person attempting to rape someone of 
the same sex: it is about an out-of-control mob wishing to torture two guests­
who happen to be of the same gender-in a sexual way, against their will. This 
is a heinous crime, one that might easily lead to the victim's death.177 Surely 
such a factual background has nothing to do with the regulation of same-sex 
voluntary intimacy. Third, and importantly, the restriction on rape-either by 
a single person or a crazed mob-applies regardless of the victim's gender. 
Whether the mob wanted to know a man or a woman, any such "knowledge" 
would clearly constitute rape. 178 Thus, the notion that God's denunciation of a 
mob's mentality aiming at raping innocent guests equals, somehow, a negative 
statement on the morality of loving, consensual acts of same-sex intimacy 
between two willing adults seems far-fetched, at best. 179 
Again, theologians took note. Peter Gomes wrote that, 
(N]owhere in the Old or New Testaments is the sin of Sodom, the cause of its 
sudden and terrible destruction, equated with homosexuals or homosexual­
ity .... Homosexual rape is never to be condoned; it is indeed, like heterosexual 
rape, an abomination before God. This instance of attempted homosexual rape, 
however does not invalidate all homosexuals or all homosexual activity. 180 
Byrne Fone goes even further, suggesting that the: 
Sodomites' threat may allude not to rape, but to more murderous violence. In 
fact, there is no sexual conduct at all on the part of the Sodomites. Though the 
language of Genesis makes it difficult to assess their motives, it is clear about 
what they do. If the Sodom story advocates the punishment of homosexual acts, 
it does so even though no such acts are committed.181 
175. Genesis 18:20 QPS Etz Haim Tms.). 
176. See GOMES, supra note 74, at 151 ("It was God's intention to destroy the city before the 
arrival of the angels, and so the punishment that befell the city had to do with its previotL' and notori­
ous state of wickedness, and not with the menacing treatment accorded to the angels while they were 
partaking of Lot's hospitality."). 
177. Indeed, the Bible includes a very similar story where the mob surrounding the house suc­
cessfully demanded the guest to get out and be "known." It ended with an all-night mutilation, and the 
guest's death. That event nearly caused a civil war in Israel. See.Judges 19:22-30. 
178. The Book of Genesis clearly demonstrates moral opprobrium towards the crime of rape. 
SP,e Genesis 34:1-31. 
179. See also MICHAELSON, supra note 115, at 60-61 (similarly rejecting the Sodom story as a 
rational basis for religious objections). 
180. Gomes, supra note 74, at 152; see also Siker, supra note 168. 
181. FoNE, supra note 82, at 79. 
138 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBUC POIJCY [Vol. 33 
Others have also noted the "homophobic violence" demonstrated by the 
story, culminating in "the threatened rape of the angels."182 
Thinking back to the three organizing principles, it is clear that a restric­
tion on same-sex intimacy is simply incongruent with a story about an inflamed 
mob. Those people lost all notion of "God's image." They have failed to treat 
their guests-and their neighbor-as themselves. They could not meet any 
standard of decency-then or now. The notion that this story should instruct us 
as we shape our moral relation towards same-sex intimacy simply cannot stand. 
What, then, are the lessons to be learned from the Tale of Sodom? There 
are several important lessons to the story, though all of them are far afield from 
any restriction on loving, consensual relations. First, many commentators note 
that the main lesson of the story relates to the duty of hospitality in the early 
Middle-East (a tradition that still holds today). According to this duty, the host 
bears absolute responsibility to protect his guests at all cost. Lot's admirable 
stand against the mob, defending his guests in the face of sure calamity, 183 is a 
prime example of performing such duty nobly. Second, the Tale of Sodom 
shows that a moral stand on behalf of the innocent does pay off at times. In this 
case, Lot and his family were the only ones saved from the city that God eviscer­
ated (but for Lot's wife, who insisted on looking back despite an explicit warn­
ing) .184 Lot protected his innocent guests without any promise for payment or 
reward, but was ultimately saved for this act of kindness. If anything, therefore, 
the Sodom story is a lesson in kindness. Finally, the Tale of Sodom does tell us 
something about sexual norms: when a city descends to the level of a blood­
thirsty mob, whose members aim at collectively raping, mutilating, and poten­
tially killing innocent "others," the wrath of God should be upon them. 
As for same-sex intimacy, the Tale of Sodom tells us nothing. Nothing at 
all. Nor should it be interpreted this way, again by way of omission. Lastly, and 
most importantly, consensual, loving relations between two people who were 
created in the image of God should never be referred to as "sodomy." 
C. Rethinking the Levitical Verses 
We now turn to the greatest interpretive challenge to the biblical text. 
Unlike the two previous basis on which religious objections seem to rely, the 
Levitical verses are not a mere narrative from which one could infer some 
notions of improper sexual behavior. Nor are the Levitical verses devoid of any 
textual mention of same-sex intimacy; they actually do explicitly contain such 
language. Further, the Levitical verses-unlike the two previous religious 
objections-can be read as, and are in fact, a part of a legal code (the Code of 
Levites, or the Priesthood Code); 185 thus, they are not merely unbinding "nar­
ratives" from which later interpretations were deduced. Finally, the two verses 
in question-Leviticus 18:22 and Leviticus 20:13-seem to directly prohibit 
same-sex intimacy and to order the death penalty upon anyone daring to 
engage in it. For these reasons, the Levitical verses were used as the founda­
tion, primarily in Jewish Law, of a remarkable-and extremely exclusory-edi­
182. Carden, supra note 83, at 38. 
183. For a review, see HELMINIAK, supra note 89, at 35-41 ("The Sin of Sodom: Inhospitality"); 
STONE, suj1ra note 8, at 14-15; Carden, supra note 83, at 37. 
184. See Genesis 19:17, 26. 
185. See, e.g., GREENBERG, supra note 90, at 75-76 ("[T]he Book of Leviticus ... is primarily a law 
book-indeed, the sages call it Torat Kohanim, the priest's handbook."). 
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fice of law directed against gays, 186 lesbians, 187 and other members of the 
LGBTQ community. l88 
The two verses, in other words, deserve a thorough examination. We 
begin, as every interpretive journey should begin, with the text. We then move 
to the context in which the text appears, in particular the Code of Holiness. 
We then consider several alternative interpretations, ones more congruent with 
the organizing principles we have mentioned. We conclude with an examina­
tion of a non-text: a different biblical source that should have, perhaps, included 
the restrictions included in Leviticus (if they ever existed), but does not. 
1. The Text 
We begin with the text. We examine the full text of the two short verses in 
three forms: first, as they appear in the Hebrew original; then, as they appear in 
King James' Bible; finally, as they should be translated today (according to the 
Hebrew original). 
Leviticus 18:22 reads: 
KJB: "Though shalt not lie with mankind, as with womankind: it is abomination." 
From the Hebrew: "And the male you shall not lie with the way one lies with a 
woman: it is an abomination."189 
Leviticus 20:13 reads: 
:D~ D;;T'ldl ,1n7;i1' nil:) ;D;;T'~o/ 1tzllJ :1~¥in--;iif~ ':;):;io/7;1 i:;ir-n~ ::l~o/' 1tV~ W'~1 
KJB: "If a man also lie with mankind, as he lieth with a woman, both of them 
have committed an abomination: they shall surely be put to death; their blood 
shall be upon them." 
From the Hebrew: "And a man who lies with a male the way one lies with a 
woman-both have committed an abomination: they shall surely be put to 
death, their blood is upon them.»L90 
186. See, e.g.• DAVID F. GREENBERG, THE CoNSTRUCrlON OF HOMOSEXUALllY 190 (1988) ("[T]wo 
passages in Leviticus seem to prohibit male homosexuality more generally"); Milgram, supra note J15 
(citing with approval Rabbi Artson as stating that "[t]he proscription of homosexual acts in Leviticus 
forms the basis for all taler halakhic prohibitions of homosexual acts.") (emphasis added). 
187. Although the Bible never mentions female homosexual acts, Jewish Law sages were quick to 
adopt the restrictions against lesbians as well. See generally Admiel Kosman & Anat Sharbat, "Two 
Women Who We>e Sporting with Each Othe>": A Reexamination of the Ha/,akhic Approaches to Lesbianism as a 
Touchstone for Homosexuality in General, 75 HEBREW UNION C. ANN. 37 (2004) (reviewing Jewish Law 
sources). The authors agree that "the Bible itself does not relate directly to female homoeroticism." 
Id. at 42. 
188. For a thorough review of Jewish Law restrictions based on these two verses, see CHAIM 
RAPOPORT, JUDAISM AND HoMosExuALnv: AN AlrrllENTIC ORTHODOX V1r.w 1-35 (2004). 
189. The rest of the text, in this section, is translated by me from the original Hebrew source. A 
note on the Hebrew term appearing at the end of the verse-"Toe'ae'vah." Its translation here, to 
"abomination," is but one interpretive option-though one preferred by most translators: the English 
Standard Version ("ESV"), the New American Standard Bible ("NASB"), KingJames Bible ("KJB"), the 
American King James Version ("AKJ"), the American Standard Version ("ASV'), Douay-Rheims Bible 
("DR"), the Darby Bible Translation ("DBT"), the English Revised Version ("ERV"), and the Webster's 
Bible Translation ("WT"). Other translators use "detestable" (e.g.• NIV, Holman Christian Standard 
Bible ("HCB"), and the World English Bible ("WEB")); "a detestable sin" (the New Living Translation 
("NLT")); "a detestable act" (e.g., NET Bible); "disgusting" (e.g., Cod's Word Translation); and 
"abhorrent" (e.g.. Etz Hayim). See Leviticus 18:22, BIBLE HuB, http://biblehub.com/leviticus/18-22 
.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2018). 
190. Leviticus 20: 13. Here I almost verbatim follow the English Standard Version translation 
(save the omission of the "And" in the beginning of the verse), which reads: "!fa man lies with a male 
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Immediately, one can observe the most glaring difference between the 
KingJames version and the Hebrew original: the omission of the word "And" at 
the beginning of each verse. 191 This is important, as "And" suggests that the 
verses in question do not stand alone, as generations of interpreters have 
presented them; rather, they are a part of a larger whole, representing a contin­
uation of several other verses. 192 They must read, in other words, in context. 
Before turning to the context, a short comment on the text itself. Since no 
man is able-literally-to lie with another man "the way one lies with a 
woman," many a biblical commentator focused on the exact biological nature 
of the textual restriction. 193 Others have suggested that the act alone may be 
prohibited, while separate expressions of same-sex intimacy are not affected. 194 
Still others considered the text as applying "only to cultic, coercive, or exploita­
tive sex."195 Finally, a prominent thinker on the issue offered to exonerate 
those who conduct such acts because of their diminished capacity to obey the 
law. 196 Beyond those suggestions, many a commentator offer to simply ignore 
the text today, much like we have done with other Biblical texts pertaining to 
slavery, stoning, animal sacrifice, and other norms we no longer consider 
valid. 197 
For the purposes of this article, however, I shall assume-following those 
who use the text for religious objections-that the text as included in these verses 
prohibits all versions of same-sex intimacy, not merely a single act. 198 Similarly, 
I shall assume that-should the current interpretation stand-same-sex marriages, 
explicitly entered into in order to preserve and consecrate such acts, cannot be 
condoned. 199 
2. The Context: The Book of Leviticus 
The text, therefore, proscribes acts of same-sex intimacy between men. It 
is also a part of a larger context ("And"). What is that context in which this text 
appears? Both verses in question are a part of the Book of Leviticus. That 
as with a woman, both of them have committed an abomination: they shall surely be put to death; their 
blood is upon them." 
191. This omission is not unique to the Kingjames version: of the twenty-two translations I have 
examined, only two-Darby Bible Translation ("DBT") and Young's Literal Translation ("YLT")­
include the word "And" at the opening of each verse. For a comparison, see Leviticus 20:13, BmLE 
HlJB, http://biblehub.com/leviticus/20-13.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2018). 
192. See, e.g., And, MERRIAM-WEBSTER D1cnoNARY (11th ed. 2016) (defining And: "used as a func­
tion word to indicate connection or addition especially of items within the same class or type"). 
193. See, e.g., Saul M. Olyan, "And with a Male You Shall Not Lie the Lying Down ofa Woman": On the 
Meaning and Signifu:ance of Leviticus 18:22 and 20: 13, 5J. HIST. SEXUALI'IY, 179, 204-05 (1994) (focusing 
on the penetrator); Daniel Boyarin, Are There AnyJews in "The History ofSexuality"?, 5J. HIST. SEXUALI'IY 
333 (1995) (same); Jerome T. Walsh, Leviticus 18:22 and 20:13: Who Is Doing What to Wlwm?, 120 J. 
BmLICAL LITERATURE 201 (2001) (focusing on person being penetrated). 
194. See, e.g., GREENBERG, sufrra note 90, at 76-85. 
195. See RABBIS MYRON S. GELLER ET AL., RABBINICAL AssEMBLY, THE HALAKHA OF SAME-SEX RELA­
TIONS IN A NEW CoNTEXT 9 (2006), https://www.rabbinicalassembly.org/sites/default/files/public/ 
halakhah/teshuvot/20052010/ geller_fine_fi ne_dissen t. pdf. 
1 96. See RAPoroRT, supra note 188. 
197. See GELLER, supra note 195, at 22. 
198. For a very different view, claiming that the text originally permitted sex between men only to 
be amended later to irn form today, see ldan Dershowitz, Revealing Nakedness and tAJncealing Homosexual 
Intercourse: Legal and Lexical Evolution in Leviticus 18, 6 HEBREW BIBLE & ANCIENT lsR., 510 (2017). 
199. I find it fascinating, in that respect, that several Rabbis have recently allowed same-sex mar­
riage to take place, while concomitantly continuing to prohibit the very act on which such maniages 
are based. See, e.g., DoRFF, supra note 130, at 19 ("The explicit biblical ban on anal sex between men 
remains in effect. Gay men are instructed to refrain from anal sex."). With all due respect, in my 
mind this is not an appropriate (or even plausible) solution. 
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book-its structure, purpose, and content-constitutes, an important layer in 
their contextual understanding. 
The Book of Leviticus-Va'Yikra ~1ji'1 ("And He called") in the original 
Hebrew-is the third of the Five Books of Moses ("Torah"). As Rabbi Green­
berg notes, this Book "lacks the narrative sweep of the other books of the Bible. 
It is primarily a law book-indeed, the sages call it Torah Kohanim, the priests' 
handbook."200 The Book is divided into three main parts: First, the laws of 
sacrifice as practiced by the priests (Chs. 1-10). Second, the laws of purity and 
holiness, as related to both priests and families in general (Chs. 11-25), of 
which the text in question is a part. And finally, some blessings and curses 
relating to God's covenant with the Israelites.201 Of the three, the first portion 
of the Book-the laws of sacrifice-has no real implications today. In fact, it 
has not been practiced for nearly 2,000 years. 202 Thus, at the outset one has to 
consider the fact that a large part of the Book of Leviticus is, in essence, 
obsolete. 
It is the second part of the Book-sometimes known as the "Holiness 
Code"203-in which the two verses reside. What is the subject-matter of that 
part? Professor Baruch A Levine, a noted expert on Leviticus, has identified 
the Jewish family-rather than the Jewish individual-as the main subject of the 
holiness code. In his words: "This section begins by ordaining the place and 
form of proper worship of the God of Israel. It then defines the Israelite family 
and details improper sexual behavior, including incest .... Chapters 20 to 22 
contain more on the Israelite family and ordain specifically priestly duties ...."204 
The focus on the family-rather than the individual-should therefore factor 
heavily into contextualizing the verses in question. The term ''.Jewish family" 
itself should be understood as relating to the extended family rather than a 
nuclear one; members of those extended families used to reside together in 
biblical times, working together as a single economic unit. 205 A sexual regula­
tion of such a unit was, therefore, required rather than merely warranted; much 
like the sexual regulation of the workplace is required today, and for the very 
same reasons. 
The notion of "holiness" provides another key element for understanding 
the Levitical prohibition. As we have seen, the second part of Leviticus is 
known as the Holiness Code. Thus, Chapter 11, which opens that part, con­
tains the following celebratory decree: "For I am the Lord your God; you shall 
sanctify yourselves and be holy, for holy am I."206 Similar decrees appear both 
near the verse prohibiting same-sex acts,207 and the one ordering the death­
200. GREENBERG, supra note 90, at 76. These priest5, known in English as the Levites, are the 
source for the translated title of the Book. 
201. See A.S. Hartom, Introduction to The Book of Leviticus, in THE BIBLE (KAssuTo lNTERPRETA· 
TION)-SH'MOT & VA'YIKRA 5 (1961) (Hebrew). 
202. ,S,.,e Yeshayahu Leibowitz, Seven Years of Discourse on the Weekly Torah Reading 437, 442 
(2003) (Hebrew) [hereinafter: LEmOWITZ, SEVEN YEARS] ("This type ofworship [through sacrifice] has 
stopped despite our best intentions and against our will with the destruction [of the Second Temple, 
70 C.E.] and has never resumed. This type of worship is entirely foreign to us today, and not only that 
but all the rules relating to impurity of the Temple do not make much sense, and even seem foreign to 
the world ofJewish knowledge and experience [as we know it today] .... Still, even if these issues carry 
little practical implications for us today, they do comprise a part and parcel of the Torah universe."). 
203. SP,e Baruch A. Levine, Introduction to Leviticus, in ETZ HAYJM: TORAH AND COMMENTARY 584 
(2001) ("Leviticus 17 to 26 cohere as a literary unit, referred to as 'the Holiness Code,' because of the 
frequent use of the term kadosh, 'holy.'"). 
204. LEIIlOWITZ, SEVEN YEARS, supra note 202, at 584 (empha,is added). 
205. See generally ODED BoROWSKI, DAJLY LIFE IN BIBLJC4\L TIMES 22 (2003). 
206. Leviticus 11 :44. 
207. See id. at 19:2. 
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penalty.208 What does "holy" mean in that context, and how may it help us 
understand the same-sex prohibitions? The term "holiness" in Judaism is com­
plex, multi-faceted, and often misunderstood. 209 For our purposes, it would be 
useful to review the last iteration of the notion in the current context, four 
verses following the death-penalty verse: "And you shall be holy to Me for I, the 
Lord, am Holy; and I shall set you apart from other peoples so you shall be 
mine."210 
A crucial element of the notion ofJewish holiness, therefore, is the unique­
ness-exceptionalism, in today's parlance-of the Jewish people.211 As Profes­
sor Levine, who coined this phenomenon "Holiness & Otherness," explains: 
The Sifra, a rabbinic midrash, conveys the concept of "otherness" in its com­
ment to Leviticus 19:2: "'You shall be holy'-You shall be distinct (fJ'rushim 
tiheyu), meaning that the people of Israel, in becoming a holy nation, must jrre­
SP.TVF. ii' distinctiveness from other jJenfJi£.<. It must pursue a way of life different from 
that practiced by other peoples) .... This statement also conveys the idea, basic 
to biblical religion, that holiness cannot be achieved by individuals alone, no 
matter how elevated, pure, or righteous. It can be rutlized only through the life of the 
community, acting UJgether. 212 
The Book of Leviticus deals, then, with the notions of family and holiness 
(exceptionalism); both refer to a community rather than the individual Jewish 
person; and both require joint effort by their members in order to achieve com­
pliance. These two contextual notions should guide us as we arrive at examin­
ing the final layer in the contextual reading of the two verses-the chapters in 
which they appear. 
3. The Context: Laws of Incest 
As one commentator has noted, "if we are attempting to use ... the [con­
textual meaning] of Leviticus 18 to infer (not impose) qualifications on the 
prohibition, then those qualifications must fit the context."213 What is the 
proper context of Leviticus 18? Chapter 18 contains 30 verses. Following a 
traditional preamble,214 it opens with an important warning: "The acts per­
formed in the Land of Egypt, where you have resided, you shall not perform; 
and the acts performed in the Land of Canaan, to which I shall lead you, you 
shall not perform; and in their laws you shall not follow."215 
This warning, we have seen, did not remain inconsequential; the entire 
body ofJewish Jaw restricting lesbian relationship is built entirely upon this sin­
gle verse.216 More generally, this opening reflects the notion of "holiness," or 
exceptionalism, which is at the heart of the Book of Leviticus-and still defines 
208. See id. at 20:26. 
209. See LEmow1r1., SEVEN YFARS, supra note 202, at 523-526 (desc1ibing, inter alia, anyone who 
uses the term outside the realm of Emunah (Jewish Faith) as blasphemous). 
210. Leviticus 20:26. 
211. See Introduction to Book a/Leviticus, in Tm: WORLD OF Bml.E-VA 'YIKRA 9 (Baruch A. Levine, 
ed., 2000) (Hebrew) ("Leviticus' Code of Holiness (Chs. 17-27) does not stem from the Mishkan 
[temporary temple] ... but from God himself, who is the only holy being, and who sanctified not only 
His own Mishkan and its p1iest,, but also the entire people of Israel. ... Since the people of Israel were 
separated from other peoples and became holy to their God, they should distance themselves from any 
impudty, either physical or moral.") (citations omitted). 
212. Baruch A. Levine, Biblical Concepts of Holiness, Mv JEw1s11 LEARNING, https://www.mr.jew­
ishlearning.com/article/biblical-concepts-of-holiness/ (emphasis added) (last visited Dec. 20, 2018). 
213. Tucker, supra note 166, at 26-27. 
214. .<iPe Leviticus 18:1-2 ("And God spoke to Moshe and said: Speak to the Children of Israel 
and tell them I am the Lord your God."). 
215. Id. at 18:3. 
216. See Kosman & Sharbat, supra note I87. 
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much ofJewish practice today. 217 But Leviticus 18:3 is only the opening of the 
chapter's two "book-ends": the other is verse 24, which states "do not defile 
yourselves in all these for these are the acts that defiled the nations that I am 
casting out before you."218 The structure of Leviticus 18, then, is of a set of 
decrees "book-ended" by the general warning for the Jewish people not to go in 
the ways of-or emulate the acts performed by-the nations around them.219 
What are, then, the acts that Leviticus 18 warns from, the acts that were 
"performed in the land of Egypt" and should be never repeated by the newly­
formed Jewish people? The answer, which is key to our understanding of the 
same-sex restricting text, arrives immediately, and creates the contextual frame­
work of the entire chapter. It reads: 
"None of you shall approach anyone of his own flesh to uncover nakedness; I am 
the Lord."220 
In other words, the main subject-matter of Leviticus 18 is the restriction on 
sexual relations with blood relatives, or, as it is commonly known today, the laws 
of incest.221 This should be clear, on its face, from the opening verses of Leviti­
cus 18. It should also be clear from Chapter 18's structure, which includes the 
two textual "book ends." It also makes sense: since the focus of the text is the 
family (as opposed to the individual), the restrictions included in it should per­
tain to the family as well. As an aside, we may also examine whether such sexual 
practices were indeed used "in the Land of Egypt" at the time. 222 Was incest 
217. Indeed, comprehensive Jewish law instructions still call today for unique behavior in almost 
all walks of life, from specific dietary laws (Kashrut), to a strict dress code (T'snee'ut, sha'at'nez, etc.), to 
limited activity on rest day (Shabbat), and many others. Here we examine one of the many unique 
rules relating to Jewish sexuality. 
218. !Llliiicus 18:24. 
219. See T1 IE WORLD OF BIBLE-VA'Y1KRA, supra note 2 I I, at 121 ("This series of Mitzvot 
[decrees] (Lev. 18:6-23) is designed to specify, at the same time, what are the 'acts of the lands of 
Egypt' and 'acts of the land of Canaan' [which you should avoid]. and 'My rules and My laws' [which 
you should keep]. This double empha,is is obtained through presenting all the vile acts by which 
Egypt and Canaan were known, phrased as negative commandments, of which the Israelites are 
warned. The double function of this series of Mitzvot is expressly noted by the verses at the end of the 
chapter Leviticus 18:24: 'Do not defile yourselves in all these'-the acts mentioned previously in verses 
6-23-'for these are the acts that defiled the nations.'") (Hebrew) (emphasis in the original). 
220. Leviticus 18:6. Unfortunately, this crucial verse presents some almost-insurmountable trans­
lation challenges. For example, the original Hebrew begins, with an uncommon repetition: "Ish, Ish" 
which literally means-"man, man" (or person, person) as in "person, person ... you shall not come 
near (or approach) ...." In choosing "None of you shall approach ... ." I have followed mostJewish 
translations UPS, Etz Chayim), as well Christian ones. For a comprehensive list, see Leviticus 18:6, 
BIBLE Hus, http://biblehub.com/leviticus/18-6.htrn (last visited Dec. 20, 2018). Still, it is important 
to note that this is far from transliteration. Second, the term "she'ar be'ssaro"-the type of person 
none should approach-was nearly transliterated to "anyone of his own flesh" by both Jewish transla­
tions above, which I also chose to adopt here. Many Christian translations, however, opted for the 
much clearer "close relative" (NlV and many others), "blood relative" (New Am. Standard, others}, or 
"near of kin" (King James Bible and many others). Finally, and most importantly, the subject of the 
restriction-the action for which you may not approach your relative-is perhaps the hardest of them 
all. Literally, "Ie'galot erva" means to uncover someone's genitalia. Again, the Jewish translators 
moved near transliteration, which I accepted above. Although many Christian translators agreed, 
some, again, preferred a much clearer note: "to have sexual relations" (NIV and others}, "for sexual 
intercourse" (Holmes Christian Standard Bible). Thus, while translated very literally (above), the 
same verse can-and perhaps should-be understood as forbidding anyone from having sexual rela­
tions with their blood relatives. 
221. See, e.g., ETZ HAYIM, supra note 155, at 688 ("Incest laws, prohibiting people from sexual 
contact with their closest relatives and underscoring those prohibitions in the strongest terms, are 
virtually universal in all ancient and modern societies."). 
222. See Artson, supra note l 15, at 27 ("Thus the Torah explicitly identifies these prohibited 
practices, these abominations, with the accepted practices of the non-Israelites of the period."). 
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common practice in ancient Egypt? Recent scholarship suggests the answer 
may be "yes. "223 Moreover, the Bible itself, reporting on pre:Jewish societies, 
mentions overt incestuous acts between a father and two of his grown daughters 
with little to no moral opprobrium.224 
Leviticus 18, then, deals with intra-family sexual restrictions. To make that 
point abundantly clear, the text does not stop at the general restriction. 
Rather, it goes on to specify, in great detail, each and every relative with whom 
such relations are prohibited. Thus, for example, the very first (almost self­
evident) prohibition is on having sexual relations with a man's mother.225 
From there, the text specifies fourteen types of relatives with whom sexual rela­
tions are forbidden. 226 Importantly, and crucially for our purposes, all the 
restrictions are aimed, by their gender-specific language, at men; and all the 
persons with whom such relations are restricted are femal,e relatives. Not a single 
male relative is mentioned throughout the chapter.227 
Before arriving at verse twenty-two-almost the last prohibition mentioned 
in the chapter-let us pause for a moment to consider the rationale for incest 
laws. Why was there a need, during biblical times, to prohibit intra-family sex­
ual relations? And why was there a need to do so in such great detail? For 
some, there is no point in looking for a reason; this is God's will, and therefore 
it should be followed. 228 Others, however, have offered a more practical 
explanation: 
Rather, one suspects that incest laws were meant to make clear that members of 
the opposite sex in one's household are not to be considered as possible sexual 
partners. A household would become impossibly "overheated" if sexually 
mature brothers and sisters, parents and children could regard each other as 
sexually available.229 
That makes great sense. As the extended household (or economic unit) 
included several family members of opposite sex and different ages, sexual reg­
223. PAUL JOHN FRANDSEN, INCESTUOUS AND CLOSE-KJN MARRIAGE IN ANCIENT EGYPT AND PERSIA 
36 (2009) ("Jn the literature on the incest problem, Ancient Egypt is frequently mentioned as the 
exception, [where the alleged universal prohibition on incest seems to have been suspended], that 
confirms the rule."); SIMON ScHAMA, THE STORY OF THEJEws 98 (2013) (citing 2 BooK OF MACCABEF.S, 
9:10) ("[W]hile other nations were capable of violating even their mothers and daughters, such abhor­
rent practices-along with homosexual copulation-was forbidden to Jews."). 
224. See, e.g., Genesis 19:32-35 (Lot and his two daughters). 
225. See Leviticus 18:7. 
226. The fourteen categories are (I adopt here the "you" and "yours" biblical form): (1) Your 
father's wife (apparently, not your mother). See Levitiru' 18:8. (2) Your sister. See id. at 18:9. (3)-(4) 
Your granddaughter-either from your son or daughter. See id. at 18:10. (5) The daughter of your 
father's wife. See id. at 18: 11. (6) The sister of your father. See id. at 18:12. (7) The sister of your 
mother. &e id. at 18:12. (8) The wife of your father's brother-your aunt. See id. at 18:8. This verse 
also contains, arguendc, a restriction of approaching the father's brother (uncle) himself, and by that 
to contain a male-and not only a female-restriction; I doubt that possibility, mainly because I can 
see no reason to single out this specific male relative as a likely sexual target. In addition, verse 18: 16 
suggest• that this verse refers only to the female mentioned therein. (9) Your daughter-in-law, your 
son's wife. See id. at 18:15. (10) Your brother's wife. See id. at 18:16. ( 11) Any woman and her daugh­
ter (presumably, of the same household). See id. at 18:17. (12) Any granddaughter (from the son's 
side). See id. (13) Any granddaughter (from the daughter's side). Se.e id. (14) Any woman and her 
sister (presumably, again, from the same household). See id. 
227. The Book of Genesis does contain an example of a sexual harassment by a female of a 
refusing male-but the two persons involved were not a part of the same family, and only one of the 
them (the harassed male) was Jewish. See Genesis 39:7-12. Thus, tl1is example does not seem to bear 
on the current text. 
228. See LEIHO'A1TJ,, SEVEN YEARS, supra note 202, at 508 (citing the Ramban for the proposition 
that "the Torah does not forbid incest because it is morally wrong, but the opposite is true: because the 
Torah prevents us from doing so, it is morally wrong."). 
229. See, e.g., En HAYIM, supra note 155, at 688. 
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ulation was pertinent. But was the typical biblical household indeed so diverse 
in terms of members and age? Modem research suggests it was: 
The nuclear family was the cornerstone of Israelite society in general and in 
village society in particular, but since the economy demanded large human 
resources the nuclear family joined with others in a larger unit, the extended 
family, which sometimes included up to three generations. The extended family 
included the (grand)father, (grand)mother, their unmarried daughters, their 
sons (married and unmarried), and their sons' wives and children. All of these 
lived in one four-room house or in a complex made of several attached houses. In addi­
tion, the compound housed unrelated people who were considered part of the 
extended family, including slaves, hired hands, and others.230 
Indeed, the typical biblical Jewish family-the one the Levitical text 
targeted-resided in one household, and comprised of several generations of 
men and women, several of whom in sexually-active ages. Clearly the biblical 
author saw great utility in regulating and restricting sexual encounters within 
such a household, within such an extended family. Equally clear is the fact that 
most of the regulatory energy was aimed at preventing unwanted heterosexual 
relations: then,231 as now,232 this kind of relations have been the norm. But 
every norm has an exception, and other types of sexual relations still required 
regulation within the family. Thus, for example, regarding children, it was 
important to clarify that child sacrifice is unacceptable. 233 Similarly, regarding 
wives (who were allowed generally to be "approached" by their husbands), it 
was important to clarify that they, too, are not always available sexually.234 
4. Back to the Verses-Part of the Laws of Incest 
Thus, finally, we arrive back at Leviticus 18:22, the only restriction aimed 
towards men with its subject matter being other males, as opposed to females. 
230. BOROWSKI, sujrra note 205, at 22. 
231. For discussion of the biblical "norm" regarding heterosexual relations, see part IA.; see also 
RAPOPORT, supra note 188, at l 47 n.25 ("The Gemara derives the ban on mi<kav zachar (homosexual 
acts) for gentiles from Genesis 2:24."). But the text of Genesis suggests no such restriction, of course; 
it merely describes the (statistically prevailing) practice of heterosexual marriage; it says absolutely 
nothing about other forms of marriage. 
232. Though the issue defies conventional polling, even today, by several current estimates still 
ninety-six percent ofAmerican population is heterosexual. See Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 668 (7th 
Cir. 2014) ("No one knows exactly how many Americans are homo-sexual. Estimates vary from about 
1.5 percent to about 4 per-cent."); Michaelson, supra note 166, at 141 ("According to our most reliable 
statistics, only 4% of Americans identify as gay or lesbian."). 
233. SP,e Leviticus 18:21 ("And thou shalt not let any of thy seed pass through the fire to 
Molech ...."). 
234. See Leviticus 18:19 ("And to !SHA during her period you shall not approach to uncover her 
nakedness"). The term !SHA, in Hebrew, means both "woman" and "wife." While most understand 
(and translate) this verse as referring to women in general, both common sense, context, and other 
Biblical laws suggest that this verse only refers to wives. First, the verse assumes the woman in question, 
during non-period times, is allowed to be "approached" sexually. But according to the Ten Com­
mandments-which have the weight of a constitutional norm, as we have seen earlier--<:me should 
refrain from either committing adultery. See Exodus 20:13. One should also refrain from coveting his 
neighbor's wife. SP,e Exodus 20: 14. A restriction later expanded to include engaged women. See gener­
ally Deuterorwmy 23-27. Accordingly, the "woman" in question cannot be someone else's. Moreover, 
since the verse is located well within the two "book ends" of Leviticus 18, it would also make sense to 
assume that it is targeted at the women of the household. Since the unmarried women were already 
"ruled out" for sexual approach previously-as elaborated by the 14 categories mentioned earlier-it 
makes much more sense to a'-sume that the !SHA which may be approached usually, but is restricted 
during her period, is one of the lawful wives, or concubines. It should be noted that, during biblical 
times, both before and after Leviticus, having multiple wives and concubines was the norm: from Jacob 
the Forefather (two wives (sisters) and two concubines to King Solomon (700 wives and 300 concu­
bines). See Genesis30:1-10; l Kings 11:3. 
146 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBIJC POLICY [Vol. 33 
That restriction reads: "And a male you shall not lie with the way one lies with a 
woman: it is an abomination."235 
We have already noted that the verse begins with an "And," a clear indica­
tion of it being part and parcel of the entire preceding section. Note also its 
location, squarely between the chapter's two "book ends"-verses 6 and 24­
which suggests that it is, and should be understood as, part of the laws of incest, 
the intra-family sexual restriction. Finally, consider the fact that the vast major­
ity of intra-family sexual prohibition are aimed at heterosexual relations. 
Accordingly, the logical interpretive conclusion is that the text in question for­
bids same-sex relations only as part of the Laws of Incest, or intra-family same­
sex relations. 
Indeed, if the intra-household regime was aimed at preventing "overheat­
ing" of the extended family environment, as Professor Levine puts it, surely 
such rationale would apply if two family members of the same gender (here, 
only male) would have sexual relations. Even the phrasing of the prohibition­
a phrasing parsed by many a Jewish Law scholar, as we have seen-seems to 
have the heterosexual relation as a model; instead of restricting "homosexual­
ity"-as Halachic sources did with lesbian relations236-the Torah text models 
the same-sex male restriction after the manner in which a man "lies with a 
woman." 
The almost inevitable conclusion, therefore, of reading Leviticus 18:22 in 
context is that the biblical prohibition against same-sex acts pertains only to 
intra-family, intra-household relations. That conclusion is perfectly congruent 
with the three organizing interpretive principles we have identified-that every 
person was created in the image of God; that every person should love another 
"as themselves"; and that the interpretive solutions to Torah texts "are not in 
the heavens." It also stems from the context of The Book of Leviticus, which 
aims at sanctifying the family and the community, providing them with ways to 
separate themselves from their non-Jewish neighbors and other nations. 
Finally, it stems directly from Leviticus 18 itself, which clearly sets two "book 
ends" to define the list of acts-or deeds-that are forbidden within the laws of 
incest. 
The same logic, and therefore the same conclusion-that the verse relates 
only to intra-family, incestuous homosexuality-should apply to Leviticus 
20:13.237 This verse, home of the notorious death penalty for same-sex acts, was 
long understood as allowing to execute both males partaking in homosexual 
intimacy, as they have committed "an abomination." First, it is important to 
note that in the past two millennia since it was inscribed, not a single death 
penalty was actually imposed for this violation.238 The death penalty language, 
therefore, should be considered more as a moral condemnation than a con­
crete legal authorization. More importantly, the death penalty verse resides 
well within the perimeters of the "Holiness Code," thus rendering it, yet again, 
well within the intra-family incestuous context. And, indeed, a quick review of 
235. /,milieus 18:22. 
236. See Kosman & Sharbat, supra note 187. 
237. Leviticus 20:13 ("And a man who lies with a male the way one lies with a woman-both have 
committed an abomination: they shall be put to death, their blood is upon them."). 
238. See RAPoroRT, supra note 188, at 137-39 n.4. The failure to impose the death penalty can 
be attributed mostly to the strict standards that were self-imposed by Jewish law: first, two witnesses 
were required to testify (both men, at the time); second, those two witnesses had to be eye-witnesses to 
a "live" violation of the rule; third, the two witnesses had to warn the couple engaged in the prohibited 
act of the capital nature of their offense; and the couple engaged-or the willing party, in the case of 
rape-had to acknowledge the warning but continue with the act nevertheless. See Samuel]. Levine, 
Capital Punishment in Jewish Law and its Application lo the American Legal System: A Conceptual Overview, 29 
ST. MARv's LJ. 1037, 1045-52 (1998). 
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the other "death penalty" authorizations appearing in Chapter 20 reveals that 
they, too, are related to incestuously prohibited sexual relations. From a death 
penalty prescribed to a man who lies with the wife of his father (presumably not 
his mother),239 a female relative who cannot be approached according to Levit­
icus 18:8; to a death penalty for lying with a man's daughter in law,240 a sexual 
restriction first appearing in Leviticus 18:15; to a death penalty for lying with a 
woman and her mother,241 which is nearly identical to the sexual restriction 
appearing on Leviticus 18:17.242 All these penalties are prescribed for intra­
family activity, and there is no reason to assume that the death penalty on same­
sex acts is any different. 
Recent theologian scholarship began also to recognize the "incest" inter­
pretation to the Levitical prohibition. For example, in 2004, Rabbi David Mil­
gram-a noted authority on the Book of Leviticus-included the possibility 
that "the homosexual prohibition [in Lev. 18:22] does not cover all male-male 
liaison, but only those within the limited circle offamily."243 Two years later, in 
2006, David Stewart proposed that "Leviticus 18:22 is an incest rule," which 
"extends the incest prohibition to all the male relatives of the same degree of 
relation as those forbidden [to] women in 18:6-18."244 Most recently, in 2009, 
Renato Lings wrote that "just as the overall aim of Lev. 18 and 20 is to ban 
incestuous heterosexual practices, Lev. 18:22 may well be there to ensure that 
homosexual incest is added to the list of proscriptions."245 
5. "The Dog that Didn't Bark" 
Sometimes the text that is not written-"the dog that didn't bark"246­
provides us with important clues as to the meaning of the written text. Take the 
Torah's fifth and final book, Deuteronomy-"D'varim" ("words" or "command­
ments") in the Hebrew original. This book is also known as "Mishne Torah"­
Secondary Torah, or Repetition of the Torah, which is the source of its English 
name.247 Accordingly, the book consists, at least in part, of a selective repeti­
tion of "highlights" of the laws and rules mentioned in the previous four 
books.248 When it comes to the sexual restrictions prescribed by Leviticus 18 
and 20, the Book of Deuteronomy dedicates a special section to such laws, 
adding to each restriction the notion of being "cursed" for its violation.249 
Thus, we learn that "[c]ursed is he who curses his father and mother";250 that 
"[c]ursed is he who lies with his father's wife";251 and "[c]ursed is he who lies 
239. See Leviticus 20: 11. 
240. See Leviticus 20: 12. 
241. See Leviticus 20:14. 
242. There, to be exact, the restriction is on lying with "a woman and her daughter." Leviticus 
18:17. Here, in Leviticus 20:17, the death penalty is imposed for lying with "a woman and her 
mother." The same rationale, however, as well as the intra-family connection, is apparent in both 
verses. 
243. JACOB MILGROM, LEVITICUS-A BOOK OF RITUAL AND ETHICS 197 (2004). 
244. David Stewart, Leviticus, in THE QUEER BIBLE CoMMENTARY, supra note 83, at 98. 
245. K. Renato Lings, The "Lyings" of a Woman: Male-Mak Incest in Leviticus 18:22?, 15 THEOLOGY 
& SEXUALITY 231, 249 (2009). 
246. The term, of course, belongs to Sherlock Holmes. See ARTHUR CoNAN DOYLE, THE ADVEN­
TURE OF SILVER BLAZE (1892). 
247. See, e.g., Jeffrey H. Tigay, Introduction to Book of Deuteronomy, in ETZ HAYIM: TORAH AND COM­
MENTARY 980 (200)). 
248. See id. at 981 ("Some of Deuteronomy's passages ... duplicate content' found elsewhere in 
the Torah."). 
249. See Deuteronomy 27:15-26. 
250. Deuteronomy 27:16 (emphasis added). CJ Leuiticus 20:9 (death penalty to same). 
251. Deuteronomy 27:20 (emphasis added). CJ Leviticus 18:6 (restriction on same); id. at 20:11 
(death penalty for same). 
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with his sister"252 and more. Yet the restriction on same-sex acts is glaringly 
missing from that list. Not a word. Not there, and not in the entire Book of 
Deuteronomy. Such an omission, as well, may teach us that the scope of Leviti­
cal prohibition was extremely narrow-within the family-and, in any event, 
did not merit a mention in the summary of these rules in Deuteronomy. 
CONCLUSION 
For millennia, the Genesis Story of Creation, the Tale of Sodom, and-in 
particular-the Levitical prohibition on same-sex intimacy were interpreted as 
universal proscriptions on same-sex intimacy. Those who attempted to chal­
lenge such understanding were silenced, or labeled intellectually dishonest; the 
biblical text, it was argued, simply does not lend itself to any other interpreta­
tion.253 In this article, I attempted to present an intellectually-defensible alter­
native to this pervasive view. According to this reading, same-sex acts were 
prohibited by the Torah only within the confines of the extended-family, and 
for the same reasons that heterosexual acts were forbidden by the same Laws of 
Incest. Such interpretation, I have demonstrated, is more compatible with the 
three organizing principles according to which all verses in the Hebrew Bible 
should be read-the notion that every person was created in the image of God; 
the duty to love your neighbor as yourself; and the understanding that the 
interpretation of the Torah is not in the Heavens. Such interpretation, I argue, 
is superior in every respect to the current understanding, according to which all 
LGBTQ members are condemned to shaming, demeaning, and hateful 
attitude. 
Understanding the biblical prohibition against same-sex acts as merely 
applying within the confines of the extended family is important for several 
reasons. First and foremost, it allows gay and lesbian people-who are not 
members of the same extended family-to freely engage in loving relationships. 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, much like the jurisprudential inevita­
bility envisioned by Justice Scalia in Windsor, the recognition of the right to 
same-sex intimacy should be followed by a similar religious recognition of same­
sex marriage. This is the path carved by the U.S. Supreme Court,254 and there 
is no reason for religious law-Jewish or otherwise-to not follow it. 
Third, from a biblical-interpretation perspective, this interpretation allows 
us to "free" many of the wonderful texts included in the Bible that have so far 
been marginalized or improperly read. Take for example King David's eulogy 
over the loss of his dearest friend, Jonathan: "So sorry am I for your loss, my 
brotherJonathan, as you have been so pleasant to me. Your love has been more 
wonderful to me than any woman's love."255 The same is true when the Wise 
King advises us, in a language that is gender-specific to two males, that "[t]wo 
are better than one ... [s]o when both of them shall lie together, it will be 
warm to both of them; and the one, how will he become warm?"256 These and 
other passages would now be able to be read in the same spirit they were writ­
ten-a spirit of love, respect, and equality. 
252. Deuteronomy 27:22 (emphasis added). 
253. See. e.g., Dennis Prnger, Homosexuality, lhe Bible, and Us-a.fewi.sh Perspective, PUB. INT., Sum­
mer 1993, at 60, 67 ("The onus is on those who view homosexuality as compatible with Judaism or 
Christianity to reconcile this view with their Bible. Given the unambiguous nature of the biblical 
attitude towards homosexuality, however, such a reconciliation is not possible. All that is possible is to 
declare: '[am aware that the Bible condemns homosexuality, and I consider the Bible wrong.' That 
would be an intellectually honest approach."). 
254. See sufrra Section I.A. 
255. 2 Samuel 1:26. 
256. Ecclesia.<les 4:9- I I . 
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Two verses in Leviticus, a story of the creation of a man and a woman, and 
a tale of a forbidden city have caused an untold amount of suffering to too 
many people of both genders. The religious freedom to argue on behalf of the 
Bible does not include a free license to treat others maliciously. This is particu­
larly so when such attitude is not called for by the Bible itself. The time has 
come to end the suffering of LGBT persons on behalf of religion. It is time to 
turn those victims into full-fledged, respected members of their religious com­
munities. It would make them better; it would make their religious communi­
ties whole; and it would correct, after too many years, one of organized 
religion's biggest mistakes. As the greatjewish Law sages have taught us-"If 
not now, then when?"25' 
257. M1SHNA, Pirkei Avot 1:14. 
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